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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R EH NQUIST 
.;§ttpTtmt t4nurlllf tfrt ~tihb .®tatts 
'J.tasfringtM. tB. QJ. 21lc?J.I-;l 
June 22, 1982 
MEMORANDUM TO · THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 82-1771 -- United States v. Leon 
This case has been relisted together with the holds for 
Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430, and I have agreed to write a 
memorandum discussing it. Respondents w~re indicted for 
violation of federal drug laws, and successfully moved to 
suppress contraband seized by police ·pursuant to aS search 
warrant authorizing searcfi o f respondent's residences and 
au t omobiles. The district court held that the search ~ 
warrant was unsupported by probable cause.  . 
~
The affidavit in support of the warrant stated that a ~ . 
confidential informant of unproven reliability told the 
police that he knew two persons who were engaged in selling P~~ 
large quantities of drugs from their home. ·He provided the 
address and said that some five months earlier he had been 
present at a sale of drugs at the residence. The police 
then initiated a month-long investigation, and observed 
numerous known drug traffickers enter the home. They also 
discovered that respondents frequented two other residences 
in the area. A search of two of the respondents at an 
airport revealed a quantity of marijuana. Based principally 
on this information, a state court iud~ issued a warrant 
authorizing searches of the re spondents' residences and 
automobiles. 
The district court found that the informant's 
reliability and credibility had not been established, and 
thus that probable cause did not exist. The district judge 
refused to recognize a good faith exception to thea) 
~ 
exclusionary rule. The Cou~f Appeals affirmed, relying 
on Aguilar and Spinelli, an~lso declining to recognize an 
exception to the exclusionary ru l e. 
. ' 
- 2 -
The petition for certiorari filed by the United States 
expressly aec!i~ s to present the question whether th~ lower 
courts im ro eri conc~uded th a t proba ble cause to support 
the warrant was lacKlng. et. at , n. 0. InsteaG; it 
pr e sent s only the question whether "the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the ~ 
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith ~ 
defective." -
fl 
A fairly . persuasive argument can be made that the 
ecision below is inconsistent with the opinion for the 
Court in Illinois v. Gates, and I suppose we have the powe ~ 
o GVR the case in light of Gates. It also provides, ~ 
however, a useful vehicle for consideration of the '~ 
reasonable good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. ',, 
On balance, I think the briefs in this case, which involves 
a slightly different factual situation than does 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, No. 82-963, would provide useful 
guidance if we should decide to formulate a good faith 
exception. I will vote to grant. 
Sincerel~y 
drk 06/11/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: No. 82-1771, United States v. Leon 
Three cases currently are pending that present the good 
faith exception to the Fourth Amendment. Each arises out of a -
slightly different factual situation and accordingly presents 
differing considerations as to granting cert. The three cases are 
as follows: /l.;l ~ , ___ 
/ 
No. 82-963, Massachusetts v. SheEEard--This is the "classic" good 
faith case. The officers sought a search and arrest warrant and the 
judge filled it out improperly. The officers, believing that the 
warrant properly authorized a more extensive search than it did, 
found evidence that led to resp's conviction for murder. The Mass. 
S. J. Ct. reversed~ it found that the evidence should have been 
excluded and explicitly rejected the State's good faith argument. 
No. 82-1771, United States v. Leon--This case presents the same 
factual situation that occurred in Illinois v. Gates. The 
,.- --..... 
magistrate issued a search warrant that was not valid in light of 
the Aguillar-SEinelli test. The police acted on the basis of the 
2. 
warrant and the evidence was suprressed over the United States' 
argument that the good faith exception should be applied. 
No. 82-1711, Colorado v. Quintero--This case presents the most far 
reaching interpretation of the good faith exception. It involves a 
situation in which the police made a good faith, but mistaken 
judgment that they have probable cause to make an arrest or search. 
All three cases present the issue clearly, and there are 
no judisdictional problems in any of them. There are some 
prudential concerns about taking either of the last two cases, most 
significantly United States v. Leon. Illinois v. Gates indicates 
that CA9 improperly determined in Leon that the search warrant was 
unconstitutional under the Aguillar-Spinelli test. Although the SG 
does not seek review of that determination, it is questionable 
whether it would appear proper to decide the harder good-faith issue 
when the simpler disposition of the case would be to GVR it in light 
of Gates. Similarly, the State in Colorado v. Quintero does not 
challenge the propriety of the state court's reasoning that the 
police lacked probable cause, but there are fairly strong facts 
suggesting that the police did have probable cause (resp Quinterro 
was identified as a possible burglary suspect, and was found with a 
television set in a strange neighborhood and with heavy wool gloves 
in his backpocket on a summer day.) If there were disagreement on 
the good-faith exception, there is a strong possibility that the 
Court might end up going off, as it did in Illinois v. Gates, on the 
ground that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. 
3. 
In terms of the possible holding, the first case--
Massachusetts v. Sheppard--is clearly the narrowest. It presents 
the question whether the good faith exception applies to a technical 
mistake or a mistake of fact. Leon, the second case, presents th 
broader issue of whether a mistaken determination by a neutral 
that probable cause exists will justify application of the good 
faith exception. The third, Quintero, presents the 
of all--whether the good faith exception applies whenever the police 
themselves have a good faith belief that probable cause exists. 
Perhaps because I tend to be cautious, I am inclined to think that 
the first case is the best one to take. Recognizing a good-faith 
exception is a significant step and it would seem best to allow the 
idea to develop in the lower courts on a case-by-case basis. 
Further, Massachusetts v. Sheppard is the kind of case where it is 
hard to say that the good faith exception is improper. Thus, it 
might provide a solid first step. 
I have attached copies of the cert pool memos in Sheppard 
and Leon. Quinterro was on the June 9 Conference and I cannot find 







<62-171 L ~. v. QLA:J.«.~. 
r .w .. ?~ ~u ~(w/o a..~ 
. --J.A) ~ kL ~ ~ 4-4_ ~ 
~ ;;2...~, j!)~ ~ ~U«4'~ C<...._ 
~  PtU;;;t~,~k~~~ 
~ 
I ~ 
i ' ~.$/q----k-1!.1)~~ 
6--. ~ 4/'/o 
· i· ~~-~~Lk 
II . n,_;__._ ~ 9 o/ H 
~"4~ ~~. $--"L-
~~ ~~# l~wCo4'4J.s/q 
·1 t-A----~1 9 ~ . _, 
·l &-( ~~ C4~ fl . . · ... 
I .:1 ' ~ ~ '•.; 




~" ~: ~,:: ~,~ '~ •' .< 
"' ~­






·~: .lit:, ~ ~·. ,w/~ 'ft ·-"'lw• 




To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: cases held for Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430 
We have received hold memos from JUSTICE REHNQUIST in 
the two cases held for~llinois v. Gate~o. 82-1711, Colorado 
v. Quintero, a~. 82-963, Massachusetts v. Sheppard. He rec-
ommends granting the former and holding the latter. This recom-
mendation is consistent with his views, but I do not think it is 
consistent with yours. Quintero is a case in which the police, 
acting in good faith, thought tli'a·t they had probable cause. 
(They probably did--but the State does not seek review on that 
....... ,ZI) (_z.\, 
fact-bound question.) There was noj~sta~e of fact, or ~isplaced 
reliance on a warrant or ~31tatute . later~eld to be invalid. All 
the State argues is that the officers had a good faith belief 
that they had probable cause. Thus the creation of a good faith 
exception here would only serve to lower the probable cause 
standard. At the moment the police must have probable cause on 
an objective basis. Under the State's rule it will be enough if 
------~------~ 
the police in good faith think that they have probable cause, 
I 
even if they objectively do not. 
with United States v. Johnson, 102 
This is plainly inconsistent 
S.Ct. 2579, 2593 {1982). 
Sheppard appears to be a much more appropriate case in 
which to consider a new rule. In that case there was a good 
faith factual error. The error did not affect the substantial 
~
rights of the defendant. This is the classic situation in which 
a good faith rule should apply, for the exclusionary rule serves 
little deterrent purpose. It is true that this case is narrower 
than some members of the Court may wish for the eventual scope of 
the good faith exception, but that seems entirely appropriate for 
a "first case." It would be better for the Court to start with a 
narrow case to announce that a good faith exception is acceptable 
under the Fourth Amendment. This would give lower courts the 
chance to experiment with the rule, leaving this Court with the 
flexibility to proceed later in whatever manner seems appropriate 
at the time. 
I understand that there are two more cases raising the 
good faith issue: No. 82-1800, Connecticut v. Z indros, and No. 
82-1771, United States v. v'Leon. z indros is on the Conference 
list for June 23, but we have not yet received the pool memo yet. 
It may be best to hold all of these cases for discussion with 
Z indros. It is silly to take a case now simply for the sake of 
reaching the issue if there is a better case coming. 
~Leon involves police reliance on a warrant later held to 
be invalid for want of probable cause. This would not be an ap-
propriate case in which to consider the issue for several rea-
sons. First, the decision below appears to be wrong on the mer-
its under Illinois v. Gates. The appropriate resolution, there-
fore, would be a GVR in light of Gates. It makes no sense to 
have a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation to trigger the application of 
the rule. Second, if there was a Fourth Amendment violation 
here, it was in issuing a warrant on less than probable cause. I 
see no way that such an error {if there was one) can be described 
as a "technical, trivial, or inadvertent" violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 n. 2 (1977) 
(POWELL, J., concurring). Issuing a warrant on less than proba-
ble cause violates the plain language at the very heart of the 
Fourth Amendment: "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
-------------------------cause." Third, application of a good faith exception in this 
----:..-
case would have the effect of insulating virtually every warrant 
decision of a magistrate from appellate review. This lack of --- - - ---------appellate review would be intolerable when one remembers that (i) 
proceedings before the magistrate are invariably ex parte, (ii) 
the magistrate is not necessarily a lawyer, (iii) the police gen-
erally can select the magistrate to whom the request for a war-
rant is directed, and (iv) if a magistrate declines to issue a 
warrant, the police may still seek a warrant from a second, 
third, or fourth magistrate. It is proper, of course, to give 
considerable deference to magistrate's decisions despite all of 
these problems. But the possibilities for abuse are too great 
when there is no realistic avenue of appellate review. Finally, 
the Court will get little help from the lower court in this case. 
CA9 affirmed the DC by order. Its full discussion of the good 
faith exception was as follows: "We have not heretofore recog-
nized such an exception and we decline the invitation to recog-
nize one at this juncture." Although this Court may need little 
help in deciding whether or not there should be a good faith ex-
ception, it would be very helpful to have opinions below consid-
ering how such an exception would apply in the circumstances of 
the particular case at issue. 
7 
fl.../"~- ~ . ;r ~'- -..- --- ,_. . 
Tk.,vt-~4 
d-u._ 
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~~ 
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~ .. 92-<::jd, 
Cert to CA9 ( ang, 
Fergerson; Ken dy ~ 
dissenting) ~ 
Federal/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Whether the 4th Amendment exclusionary rule 
should be modified to allow admission of evidence seized in 
reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant subsequently 
held to be defective. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS: Resps were indicted for 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy. 
Resps successfully moved to suppress contraband and other 
11u_ <-t ~ A~ ---.-r i ~~~ 
~ ... ~)- ~~ -t. '--
-2-
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant authorizing the 
search of residences and automobiles belonging to them. The DC 
found that the search warrant was not supported by probable 
cause. 
The ~fidavit in support of the search warrant alleged that 
-----·~· ----~ 
a confidential informant of unproven reliab lity told a police 
officer that he knew two persons who were selling large 
quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence. He 
provided an address, and stated that he had been present at the 
residence 5 months earlier and had witnessed the sale of drugs. 
On receipt of this information, the Burbank police department 
r 
instituted a month-long investigation, during which a number of 
individuals known to be involved in drug trafficking visited the 
residence. A small amount of marijuana was also found in the 
possession of two residents who were searched, with their 
consent, by airport narcotics officers. On this information, a 
~search warrant was issued authorizing the search of the 
residences and automobiles involved. In the ensuing searches, 
police officers seized significant amounts of cocaine and 
methaqualone tablets. 
The DC suppressed the evidence finding that there was "no 
question" that the reliability and credibility of the informant 
had not been established. The DC rejected the government's 
argument that the exclusionary rule should not apply when 
evidence is seized in reasonable good-faith reliance on a search 
warrant, but observed that the officers acted in good faith. 
On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of CA9 affirmed the 
-3-
suppression order. The majority held that the information 
supplied by the informant was stale in part and inadequate under 
both prongs of the Aquilar-Spinelli test and that the. police 
investigation was insufficient to collaborate the informants' 
information. Finally, the majority declined to recognize a good-
'------
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Judge Kennedy 
dissented, concluding that the informants' information was both 
sufficiently current and adequately collaborated by the police 
investigation. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG maintains that this case raises the 
same issue now pending before the court following reargument in 
Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430. In Gates, or alternatively in 
this case, the Court is presented with an opportunity to examine 
the policies of the exclusionary rule as they relate to evidence 
obtained pursuant to a warrant. This case will either be 
controlled by the decision in Gates or it will present a suitable 
independent vehicle for resolution of this question. The SG 
expressly does not seek review on the probable~ issue, 
stating that it is fact-bound and not independently worthy of 
this Court's consideration. 
v--
Resp answers that there was no valid judicial finding of 
subjective good-faith in this case: and that state law should 
have been applied in this case because the search warrant and the 
supporting affidavit were prepared and signed by state police 
officers. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case presents a suitable opportunity 
for the Court to consider whether to adopt a good-faith exception 
-4-
to the exclusionary rule for searches conducted pursuant to a 
warrant. The issue was squarely raised and rejected below. As 
- -- ----------
it is a federal case, there is no state law concern • . The only 
potential problem is that the decision on probable cause is now 
highly questionable in light of Ill. v. Gates. But the United 
States expressly does not present this issue and under s. Ct. 
Rule 21, "only the questions set forth in the petn or fairly 
included therein will be considered by the Court." 
I recommend that the petn be considered together with 
Massachusetts v. Shepherd No. 82-963, whi'ch also poses the good-
faith issue and has been held for Illinois v. Gates. 
There is a response. 
June 8, 1983 
dag 
Singer Opin in petn. 
TZ..._ 0.~ ~ ..._kt .._ t-h.-... 
\"' ~ L.:, <t'V',. ~ ~.l ~ 
+.:> ~ e._ ,<'_.e. 0. . G- \) ~ LA:- G-~ 
Jj Dl~~~ ., . ~n::) ~ ~ _ 
<;[~~ /11-~"-'--'1 ;-..,.5_..._. ~~~ 
~ c.~ ~~ &-- ~L {J' 
M~~~ .,.S:~l~J,~~ 
~ ~£ tn 5Dic.-:::cn~ v · ~'">. 
!<rc.. 
J 
..... -··- ...._.._,, ...LJV..J 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 










G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
Burger, Ch. J .................. v.' / ......... ........... . 
Brennan, J.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
No. 82-1771 
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
White, J ...................... Y . / ................ . 
Marshall, J.. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. ~ .. V /t .. .. . 
Blackmun, J ................... .' / ...... ~ ......... ~ 
. ·fll. .. r ........................... . 
. 1 .-~~~~ ........................ . 
Powell, J . ..................... Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Rehnquist, J . ................. l / 
Stevens, J ........................... . ·. ·. ~.~·: ·.t!: /Z ·. ·0:~ ·. ~ .;; ~~·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. · ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. 
O'Connor, J .......................... . 
,,. I I 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19, \.J• •Ulll:: ~..) f .1.::10.) 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 












G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF· G D 
Burger, Ch. J ................. ~ ' / .................... . 
Brennan, J .............................................. . 
White, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V . / ....... · · ... · · · · · · · · · 
AB SENT NOT VOTING 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ~ ~ . J . . . . . ... ~ . ~ . '/,#.'; . ;;.. ...... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Blackmun J ... I ............ ~~. ~~ ."":'"":"' .......................... . ' .................. ... ... ....  
Powell, J ..................... f ~!0> . • • . •.• • .• • · • • · · · · · • 
Rehnquist, J .................. l Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
I c Stevens, J ........................... . 
., .......................... . 
/t . .. 
' O'Connor, J .......................... . ...... ~ ~ .... 
Justice Marshall L/\,.. ' r 
~ ~~ ~ Justice Blackmun 
-J.-:- -·· ~ _ 1 _., ~ _J ~ ~ ~ L....c- -=;.' Justice Powell {/{ tJ 1. 
[, ~ -T .. ~~~~-~~ JusticeRehnquist ~~ 
~' '• .C CH .. r~ :;:s THROUGHOUT. Justice Stevens / (;, 




7 , Justice O'Connor l/ 
----~ - From: Justice White 
2 ' ~ Jt W ~ ~ ~ Circulated: FEB 2 3 1984 
,,~ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
~~-22, (~~4~ 
1st DRAFTL.-Y'\... c..~ ~ t--t....J 
/ SUPREME COURT OF THE~~) 
I').A /Q YJ ~~- s~~ ~ 
yr_ () /- - 1 No. 82-1771 r p 2 -z- UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ALBERTO 
ANTONIO LEON ET AL. :5~~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF e/-
1
_ ~ ~ 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ~_:-
[February-, 1984]  
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ - _l ~ 
This case presents the question whether the Fourth ~~-~
Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to -
bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence ob-~ . /) 
tained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search V 1-r.r 
warrant issuea by a detached ana neutral magistrate but ulti- 0 
ma~upported by probable cause. TOre-
solve this question, we must consider once again the tension 
between the sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand, 
deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to 
unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, estab-
lishing procedures under which criminal defendants are "ac-
quitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which ex-
poses the truth." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 
165, 175 (1969). 
I 
In August 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reli-
<!21lity informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department 
that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy" 
were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone 
from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal. 
The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of 
methaqualone ny "Patsy" a~nceapprox1mately five 
months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox con-
taining a farge amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy." He 
-----
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further declared that "Armando" and "Patsy" generally kept 
'ohly small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored 
the remainder at another location in Burbank. 
On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initi-
ated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price 
Drive reSI~ two other residences as well. 
Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to 
belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously 
been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stew-
art, who had no criminal record. During the course of the 
investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to 
respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been ar-
rested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the 
Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the 
house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack, 
and drove away. A check of Del Castillo's probation records 
led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone 
number Del Castillo had listed as his employer's. Leon had 
been arrested in 1980 on drug charges and a companion had 
informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily in-
volved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before 
the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had 
learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer 
that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his resi-
dence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation, 
the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716 
South Sunset Canyon in Burbank. 
Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at 
least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at 
the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages; 
observed a variety of other material activity at the two resi-
dences as well as at a condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena; 
and witnessed a variety of relevant activity involving re-
spondents' automobiles. The officers also observed respond-
ents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami. 
.... . ., ... ,' . ~ ' 
82-1771-0PINION 
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The pair later returned to Los Angeles together, consented 
·. · · · · · to a search of their luggage that revealed only a small amount 
of marihuana, and left the airport. Based on these and other 
observations summarized in the affidavit, App. 34, Officer 
Cyril Rombach of the Burbank Police Department, an experi-
enced and well-trained narcotics investigator, prepared an 
application for a warrant to search 620 Price Drive, 716 South 
Sunset Canyon, 7902 Via Magdalena, and automobiles regis-
tered to each of the respondents for an extensive list of items 
believed to be related to respondents' drug-trafficking activi-
ties. Officer Rombach's extensive application was reviewed 
by several Deputy District Attorneys. -
. , . . . '; .•. : . . · .. :·· 
A ac1a y va 1 searc warrant was issued in September 
1981 oy a state~r c'Otirt judge. The ensuing searches 
produced large quantities of drugs at the Via Magdalena and 
Sunset Canyon addresses and a small quantity at the Price 
Drive residence. Other evidence was discovered at ~ach of 
the ~s and in Stewart's ano Del Castillo's automo-
biles. Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California and charged 
with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a vari-
h~stantive counts. 
The respondents then filed motions to suppress the evi-
dence seized pursuant to the warrant. 1 The District Court 
held an evidentiary hearing and, while recognizing that the 
1 Responde~t Leo~ ~oved to supp~ess the evidence found ~n his person 
at the time of his arrest and the evidence seized from his residence at 716 
South Sunset Canyon. Respondent Stewart's motion covered the fruits of 
searches of her residence at 620 Price Drive and the condominium at 7902 
Via Magdalena and statements she made during the search of her resi-
dence. Respondent Sanchez sought to suppress the evidence discovered 
during the search of his residence at 620 Price Drive and statements he 
made shortly thereafter. He also joined Stewart's motion to suppress evi-
dence seized from the condominium. Respondent Del Castillo apparently 
sought to suppress all of the evidence seized in the searches. App. 78-80. 
The respondents also moved to suppress evidence seized in the searches of 
their automobiles. 
I, ' • I, ~ 
~ • ._. } I .:.. I, ' • ., • • .... "' : • • ' •'. • 
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case was a close one, see App. 131, anted the motions to /) L... 
suppress in part. It conCluded that the affidavit was ins ffi-
cient to establish probable cause, 2 but did not suppress all of 
the evidence as to all of the respondents because none of the 
respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. 3 
In response to a request from the Government, the court 
made clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, but 
it rejected the Government's suggestion that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evi-
dence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search 
warrant. 4 
2 "I just cannot find this warrant sufficient for a showing of probable 
cause. 
There is no question of the reliability and credibility of the informant as 
not being established. 
~en tended to corroborate, maybe, the reliability of [the 
informant's] information about the previous transaction, but if it is not a 
stale transaction, it comes awfully close to it; and all the other material I 
think is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt. 
So I just do not think this affidavit can withstand the test. I find, then, 
that there is no probable cause in this case for the issuance of the search 
warrant ... . " App. 127. 
8 The District Court concluded that Sanchez and Stewart had standing to 
challenge the search of 620 Price Drive; that Leon had standing to contest 
the legality of the search of 716 South Sunset Canyon; that none of the re-
- spondEmts had established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the condo-
minium at 7902 Via Magdalena; and that Stewart and Del Castillo each had 
standing to challenge the searches of their automobiles. The Government 
indicated that it did not intend to introduce evidence seized from the other 
respondents' vehicles. App. 127-129. Finally, the court suppressed 
statements given by Sanchez and Stewart. Id., at 129-130. 
' "On the issue of good faith, obviously that is not the law of the Circuit, 
and I am not going to apply that law. 
I will say certainly in my view, there is not any question about good 
faith. [Officer Rombach] went to a Superior Court judge and got a war-
rant; obviously laid a meticulous trail. Had surveilled for a long period of 
time, and I believe his testimony-and I think he said he consulted with 
.. .~. ~ . 
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The District Court denied the Government's motion for re-
consideration, App. 147, and a divided panel of the Court of C:. /1- ~ 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ~d. It first concluded 
that Officer Rombach's affidavit could not establish probable ~ ~ 
cause to search the Price Drive residence. To the extent  
that the affidavit set forth facts demonstrating the basis of 
the informant's knowledge of criminal activity, the informa-
tion included was fatally stale. The affidavit, moreover, 
failed to establish the mformant's credibility. Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeals cone u e t at the information provided 
by the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the 
two-part test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 375 U. S. 108 
(1964), and Spinelli v. Uniteasrates, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 5 
The officers~pendent investigation neither cured the 
staleness nor corroborated the details of the informant's dec-
larations. The Court of Appeals then considered whether 
the affidavit formed a proper basis for the search of the Sun-
set Canyon residence. In its view, the affidavit included no 
facts indicating the basis for the informants' statements con-
cerning respondent Leon's criminal activities and was devoid 
of information establishing the informants' reliability. Be-
cause these deficiencies had not been cured by the police in-
vestigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits 
of the search. The Court of Appeals refused the Govern-
ment's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Petn. for Cert. 4(a). 
· The ·Government's petition for certiorari expressly de-5~> 6- . 
clined to seek review of the lower courts' determinations that ~· d 
the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and ;f.:L~~ ~ 
. '··· ..... .. . . ·: 
~three Deputy District Attorneys before proceeding himself, and I certainly 
have no doubt about the fact that that is true." App. 140. erf~ 
5 In Illinois v. Gates, -U. S. - (1983), decided last Term, the 
Court abandoned the two-pronged Aquilar-Spinelli test for determining 
whether aiiTnrormanT s tip suffices to establish probable· cause for the issu-
ance of a warrant and substituted in its place a "totality of the circum-
stances" approach. - -
~~
• • '!. :.. \ i' ~ J #. 
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presented only the question "[ w ]hether the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusi.onary rule should be modified so as not to bar the 
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reli-
ance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be de-
fective." We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of 
such a modification. -- U. S. -- (1983). Although it 
undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question 
whether probable cause existed under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates, 
-- U. S. -- (1983), that question has not been briefed or 
argued; and it is also within our authority, which we choose 
to exercise, to take the case as it comes to us, accepting the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that probable cause was lacking 
under the prevailing legal standards. See This Court's Rule 
21.1(a). 
We have concluded that the Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its 
ability to perform its intended functions. Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Jus-
tices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a 
necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651, 655-657 (1961) (plurality opinion); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 462-463 (1928), or 
that the rule is required by the conjunction of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 661-662 
(Black, J., concurring); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 
20, 33-34 (1925). These implications need not detain us long. 
The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical anal-
ysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 
463 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment "has never been in-
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally sejzed evi-
dence in all proceedings or against all persons." V'Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976). 
..... . 
'• 'A • • 't - • •", 
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The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly 
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its 
commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes 
makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or 
seizure "work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong." 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974). The 
wrong condemned by the Amendment is "fully accomplished" 
by the unlawful search or seizure itself, ibid., and the exclu-
sionary rule is neither intended nor able to "cure the invasion 
of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered." 
Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
The rule thus operates as "a judicially created remedy de-
signed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-
tional right of the person aggrieved." United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately im-
posed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is "an 
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were vio-
lated by police conduct." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at --. 
Only the former question is currently before us, and it must 
be resolved by wei hin the costs and benefits of reventing 
th~ prosecution's· case-in~chief of i@erently trust-
worthy tangi_ble evidence obtained in reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ul-
timately is found to be defective. 
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary 
rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have 
long been a source of concern. "Our cases have consistently 
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary 
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and 
·· ..... ·· .. ··. .. . ~ . . . 
~·~ >.~.··.•.: 
..... 
-;. • .. • i. 
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jury." United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 (1980). 
An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference 
with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function is 
that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced 
sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. 6 Particu-
6 Researchers have only recently begun to study extensively the effects 
of the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. One study 
suggests that the rule results in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of be-
tween 0.6% and 2.35% of individuals arrested for felonies. Davies, A 
Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" 
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Ar-
rests, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J. 611, 621 (forthcoming). The estimates are 
higher for particular crimes the prosecution of which depends heavily on 
physical evidence. Thus, the cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or 
nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably in 
the range of2.8% to 7.1%. !d., at 680. Davies' analysis of California data 
suggests that screening by police and prosecutors results in the release be-
cause of illegal searches or seizures of as many as 1.4% of all felony arrest-
ees, id., at 650, that 0. 9% of felony arrestees are released because of illegal 
searches or seizures at the preliminary hearing or after trial, id., at 653, 
and that roughly 0.5% of all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on ap-
peal because of illegal searches. I d., at 654. See also K. Brosi, A Cross-
City Comparison of Felony Case Processing 16, 1~19 (1979); Report of the 
Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclusionary 
Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 10-11, 14 (1979); F. Feeney, F. Dill 
& A. Weir, Arrests Without Convictions: How Often They Occur and Why 
203-206 (1983); National Institute of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusion-
ary Rule: A Study in California 1-2 (1982); Nardulli, The Societal Cost of 
the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J. 
585, 600 (forthcoming). The exclusionary rule also has been found to af-
fect the plea-bargaining process. S. Schlesinger, Exclusionary Injustice: 
The Problem of Illegally Obtained Evidence 63 (1977). But see Davies, 
supra, at 66~69; N ardulli, supra, at 604-606. 
Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of the exclu-
sionary rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages with which they 
deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are released because the 
cases against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures. 
"[A]ny rule of evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative and 
reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be 
carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way ~ er-
ring official unlawlessness." Illinois v. Gates , -- U. S. --, --
.' 
,· .. 
..... :··-: . ··,· ."'• 
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larly when law enforcement officers have acted in good faith 
: . <;>r th_ei:r: transgressions have been minor,. the magnitude. of 
the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic 
concepts of the criminal justice system. Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 490. Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary 
rule, therefore, may well "generat[e] disrespect for the law 
and the administration of justice." Id., at 491. Accord-
ingly, "[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial ob-
jectives are thought most efficaciously served." United 
States v. Calandra, supra, at 348; see Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 486-487; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447 
(1976). 
B 
Close attention to those remedial objectives has character-
ized our recent decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court has, to be sure, 
not seriously questioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious 
sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress ev-
idence from the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amend-
ment violation has been substantial and deliberate. . . . " 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. Pow-
ell, supra, at 492. Nevertheless, the balancing approach 
that has evolved in various contexts-including criminal tri-
als-"forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more 
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence ob-
,.,~, ', '• ' ,· • ....... I : · ~ . tained in the :reasonable good-faith belief that a search or sei-
. ~ure was in accord ·with the Fourth Amendment." Illinois 
v. Gates, supra, at -- (WHITE, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Court empha-
sized the costs of the exclusionary rule, expressed its view 
(1983) (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Because we find that the 
rule can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situatio~ 5 
consideration in this case, see post, at-, we conclude that it cannot pay 
its way in those situations. 
··, '• .. ·>i"·, . . ...... 
....... 
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that limiting the circumstances under which Fourth Amend-
ment claims could be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings would not reduce the rule's deterrent effect, id., at 
489-495, and held that a state prisoner who has been afforded 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that 
unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial. 
Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 560-563 (1979). Pro-
posed extensions of the exclusionary rule to proceedings 
other than the criminal trial itself have been evaluated and 
rejected under the same analytic approach. In United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), for example, we de-
clined to allow grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer ques-
tions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or 
seizure since "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might 
be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings 
is uncertain at best." Id., at 348. Similarly, in United 
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), we permitted the use in 
federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized by state 
officials since the likelihood of deterring police misconduct 
through such an extension of the exclusionary rule was insuf-
ficient to outweigh its substantial social costs. In so doing, 
we declared that, "[i]f ... the exclusionary rule does not re-
sult in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the in-
stant situation is unwarranted." ld., at 454. 
As cases considering the use of unlawfully obtained evi-
dence in criminal trials themselves make clear, it does not fol-
low from the emphasis on the exclusionary rule's deterrent 
value that "anything which deters illegal searches is thereby 
commanded by the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S., at 174. In determining whether 
persons aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evi-
dence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or co-
defendants could seek suppression, for example, we found 
that the additional benefits of such an extension of the exclu-
sionary rule would not outweigh its costs. I d., at 17 4-175. 
82--1771-0PINION 
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Standing to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in 
which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal 
search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct. 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United 
States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963). Cf. United States v. Payner, 447 
u. s. 727 (1980). 
Even defendants with standing to challenge the introduc-
tion in their criminal trials of unlawfully obtained evidence 
cannot prevent every conceivable use of such evidence. Evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and in-
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief may be used to 
impeach a defendant's direct testimony. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U. S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). 
A similar assessment of the "incremental furthering" of the 
ends of the exclusionary rule led us to conclude in United 
States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627 (1980), that evidence in-
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief or otherwise as 
substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach state-
ments made by a defendant in response to "proper cross-
examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct 
examination." ld., at 627-628. 
When considering the use of evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment in the prosecution's case-in-chief, 
moreover, we have declined to adopt a per se or but for rule 
that would render inadmissible any evidence that came to 
light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal 
arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun 
v. United States, supra, at 487-488. We also have held that 
a witness' testimony may be admitted even when his identity 
was discovered in an unconstitutional search. United States 
v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978). The perception underly-
ing these decisions-that the connection between police mis-
conduct and evidence of crime may be sufficiently attenuated 
to permit the use of that evidence at trial-is a product of 
.~ :: . .. . 
I •'' 
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considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the con-
stitutional principles it is designed to protect. Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979); United States v. 
C eccolini, supra, at 279. 7 In short, the "dissipation of the 
taint" concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether 
exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to 
mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of ille-
gal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent ef-
fect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." 
Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 609 (POWELL, J., concurring in 
part). Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assess-
ment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an 
important step in the calculus. Dunaway v. New York, 
supra, at 218; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 603-604. 
The same attention to the purposes underlying the exclu-
sionary rule also has characterized decisions not involving the 
scope of the rule itself. We have not required suppression of 
the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-faith 
reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently 
is declared unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 
U. S. 31 (1979). 8 Similarly, although the Court has been un-
7 "Brown's focus on 'the causal connection between the illegality and the 
confession' . . . reflected the two policies behind the use of the exclusionary 
rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. Where there is a close causal 
connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclu-
sion of evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the fu-
. 't\rre, but use of the evidence is more likeiy to compromise the integrity of 
the courts." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979) (cita-
tion omitted). 
8 We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule requires suppres-
sion of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not 
yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and sei-
zures without probable cause or search warrants. See, e. g., Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). 
"Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized 
searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional warrant 
'· · 
............ :·, '·. 
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willing to conclude that new Fourth Amendment principles 
are always to have only prospective effect, United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 560 (1982), 9 no Fourth Amendment 
decision marking a "clear break with the past" has been ap-
plied retroactively. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 
531 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 (1969); 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). 10 The propriety 
of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth 
Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely 
in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the 
and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 39 (1979). The substantive Fourth Amend-
ment principles announced in those cases are fully consistent with our hold-
ing here. 
9 The Court held in United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537 (1982), that 
a construction of the Fourth Amendment that did not constitute a "clear 
break with the past" is to be applied to all convictions not yet final when 
the decision was handed down. The limited holding, see id., at 562, 
turned in part on the Court's judgment that "[f]ailure to accord any retro-
active effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would 'encourage police or 
other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a 
let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach."' Id., at 561 (emphasis in original), 
quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas, J., dis-
senting). Contrary to respondents' assertions, nothing in Johnson pre-
cludes adoption of a good-faith exception tailored to situations in which the 
police have reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate but later found to be defective. 
10 Our retroactivity decisions have, for the most part, turned on our as-
sessments of "(a) the purpose .. to be served by the neW' stand8.rds, (b) the 4 -· 
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, 
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive applica-
tion of the new standards." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967). 
As we observed earlier this Term, 
"In considering the reliance factor, this Court's cases have looked pri-
marily to whether law enforcement authorities and state courts have justi-
fiably relied on a prior rule of law said to be different from that announced 
by the decision whose retroactivity is at issue. Unjustified 'reliance' is no 
bar to retroactivity. This inquiry is often phrased in terms of whether the 
new decision was foreshadowed by earlier cases or was a 'clear break with 
the past."' Solem v. Stumes, No. 81-2149, circulating draft at 7-8. 
. ·. .·.·.· ' 
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deterrence of police misconduct. United States v. Johnson, 
supra, at 560-561; United States v. Peltier, supra, at 
536--539, 542. 
As yet, we have not recognized any form of good-faith ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 11 But 
the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of 
experience with the rule provides strong support for the 
modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below, s 
our evaluation of the costs and benefits of su ressin reli-
able physical evi~nce se1ze by o ficers reasonably rel~ng 
on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 
leads to the~ that sucll eVIdence Shoulabe admissi-
ble in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 
III 
A 
Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny 
of a neutral ma"glstrate, which is a more reliable safeguard 
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a 
law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime,"' United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U. S. 1, 9 (1971) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 
U. S. 10, 14 (1948)), we have expressed a strong preference 
for warrants and declared that "in a doubtful or marginal case 
a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without 
one it would fail." . United States v. Ventresca, . 380 U. S. 
102, 106 (1965). · ·see 'Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 111 
11 Members of the Court have, however, urged reconsideration of the 
scope of the ~clusionary rule. See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 
496 (1976)~URGER, C. J., concurring); id., at 536 j WHITE, J., dissenting); 
Illinois v. Gates,- U.S.-,- (1983) lWHITE, J., con_c!}l'l'ing in 
the judgment); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 60~12 (1975) '(l>owELL, 
J., concurring in part); California v. Minjares, 443 U. S. 916 (1979) 
\,/1REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of stay). One Court of Appeals, 
no doubt influenced by these individual urgings, has adopted a form of 
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Williams, 
622 F. 2d 830 (CA5 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1127 (1981). 
.·.• . ..: .. 
: . 
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(1964). Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the ques-
tion whether a particUlar affi<fiiVirestaNislies prooable 
cause, and we have tlitrseoncrudeo that the preferenc~ · !or 
warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according 
\:"gt:12at deferen~ to a magistrates etermination-:--Spinelli 
v. United States, 393 ~969). See Illinois v. 
Gates, -- U. S. --, -- (1983); United States v. 
Ventresca, supra, at 108--109. 
Deferenc~() the ~ate, however, is not boundless. 
It is ctear,liTst:tflat, the deference accorded to a magistrate's 
finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the 
kno~ng or reckless falsityof the affidavit on which that 
determ1nati6n was based. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 
154 (1978). 12 Second, the courts must also insist that the(( 
magistrate purport to "perform his 'neutral and detached' 
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the po-
lice." Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 111. See Illinois v. 
Gates, supra, at--. A magistrate failing to "manifest that 
neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer 
when presented with a warrant application" and who acts in-
stead as "an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot provide 
valid authorization for an otherwise unconstitutional search. 
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 326-327 (1979). 
Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based 
on an affidav1 at oes no provide the magistrate Wl a 
suOst:antlaTbasis for determining e ex1s ence o probable 
cause." llltnois v. ?JiiteS;supra, at "Sufficient' in-
formatfon must be presented to the magistrate to allow that 
official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a 
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Ibid. 
See Aguilar v. Texas, supra; Giordenello v. United States, 
357 U. S. 480 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U. S. 
12 Indeed, "it would be an unthinkable imposition upon [the magistrate's] 
authority if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliber-
ately or recklessly false statement, were to stand beyond impeachment." 
438 U. S., at 165. 
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41 (1933). 13 Even if the warrant application was supported 
by more than a "bare bones" affidavit, a reviewing court may 
properly conclude that, notwithstanding the deference that 
magistrates deserve, the warrant was invalid because the 
magistrate's probable-cause determination reflected an im-
proper analysis of the totality of the circumstances, Illinois 
v. Gates, supra, at--, or because the form of the warrant 
was improper in some respect. 
Only in the first of these three situations, however, has the 
Court set forth a rationale for suppressing evidence obtained 
pursuant to a search warrant; in the other areas, it has sim-
ply excluded such evidence without considering whether 
Fourth Amendment interests will be advanced. To the ex-
tent that proponents of exclusion rely on its behavioral ef-
fe5ts on judges and magistrates in these areas, their re_liance 
is misplaced. First, the exclusionary rule 'rs designed to de-
ter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of 
judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence 
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore 
or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness 
among these actors requires application of the extreme sanc-
tion of exclusion. 14 
13 See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964), in which the Court con-
cluded that "the record ... does not contain a single objective fact to sup-
port a belief by the officers that the petitioner was engaged in criminal ac-
tivity at the time they arrested. him." Id., at 95. Although the Court was 
willing to assume that the arresting officers acted in good faith, it con-
cluded that 
"'good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.' Henry v. 
United States, 361 U. S. 98, 102. If subjective good faith alone were the 
test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the 
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only 
in the discretion of the police." Id., at 97. 
We adhere to this view and emphasize that nothing in this opinion is in-
tended to suggest a lowering of the probable cause standard. On the con-
trary, we deal here only with the remedy to be applied to a concededly un-
constitutional search. 
"Although there are assertions that some magistrates become rubberJ 
stamps for the police and others may be unable effectively to screen police 
, . ~· 
... 
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Third, and most important, we discern no basis, and are of-,...---._.,_ 
fered none, for ~believing that exc~o of evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrant will have a signficant deterrent effect 
on tnei8Su1ng judge or magistrate. 15 Many of the factors 
that indicate tFiattlie exclusionary rule cannot provide an ef-
fective "special" or "general" deterrent for individual offend-
ing law enforcement officers 16 apply as well to judges or mag-
istrates. And, to the extent that the rule is thought to 
operate as a "systemic" deterrent on a wider audience, 17 it 
conduct, see, e. g., 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 4.1 (1978); Kamisar, 
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" 
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565, 
569-571 (1983); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Al-
ternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1412 (1981), we 
are not convinced that this is a problem of major pro ortions. See L. TIT: 
fany, . c n yre . o en erg, DetectiOn o rime 119 (1967); Israel, 
Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren 
Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1414, n. 396 (1977); P. Johnson, New Ap-
proaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 8-10 (Working Paper, Sept. 
1978), quoted in Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Pro-
cedure 229-230 (5th ed. 1980); R. Van Duizend, L. Sutton & C. Carter, The 
Search Warrant Process ch. 7 (Review Draft, 1983). 
15 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized in Com-
monwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 506, -- N. E. 2d --, --
(1982): 
"The exclusionary rule may not be well tailored to deterring judicial mis-
conduct. If applied to judicial misconduct, the rule would be just as costly 
.as it is when it is applied to police misconduct, but it may be ill-fitted to the 
job-created motivations of judges. . . . · [l]deally a judge is impartial as 
to whether a particular piece of evidence is admitted or a particular defend-
ant convicted. Hence, in the abstract, suppression of a particular piece of 
evidence may not be as effective a disincentive to a neutral judge as it 
would be to the police. It may be that a ruling by an appellate court that a 
search warrant was unconstitutional would be sufficient to deter similar 
misconduct in the future by magistrates." 
But see United States v. Karanthanos, 531 F. 2d 26, 33-34 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 428 U. S. 910 (1976). 
" See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (BURGER, C. J., 
concurring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 
37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 709-710 (1970). 
17 See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,221 (1979) (STEVENS, 
......... ' .. ·-· 
' . 
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clearly can have no such effect on individuals empowered to 
issue search warrants. Judges and . magistrates are not I 
adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial offi-
cers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal 
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be ex-
pected significantly to deter them. Imposition of the exclu-
sionary sanction is not necessary meaningfully to inform judi-
cial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that 
admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at 
the same time declaring that the warrant was somehow de-
fective will in any way reduce judicial officers' professional 
incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage 
them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all 
colorable warrant requests. 18 
B 
If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subse-
quently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, 
therefore, it must alter the behavior of individual law en-
forcement officers or the policies of their departments. One 
could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases 
where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the 
J., concurring); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo. 
L. J. 365, 399-401 (1981). 
18 Limiting the application of the exclusionary sanction may well increase 
the care . with which magistrates scrutinize warrant applications. We ·· · .' ·~: . · . ·, 
doubt that magistrates are more desirous of avoiding the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained pursuant to warrants they have issued than of avoiding in-
vasions of privacy. To the extent that a good-faith exception is perceived] . - . ' .£ 
as shifting responsibility for protecting privacy from reviewing courts to --~
magistrates, it may have beneficial effects on magistrates' performance. 
Federal magistrates, moreover, are subject to the direct supervision of j 
district courts. They may be removed for "incompetency, misconduct, ne- t:( ~ 
glect of duty, or physical or mental disability." 20 U. S. C. § 631(1). If a ·/ 
magistrate serves merely as a "rubber stamp" for the police or is unable to 
exercise mature judgment, closer supervision or removal provides a more 
effective remedy than the exclusionary rule. 
... 
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warrant application deters future inadequate presentations 
or "magistrate shopping" and thus promotes the ends of the 
Fourth Amendment. Suppressing evidence obtained pursu-
ant to a technically defective warrant supported by probable 
cause also might encourage officers to scrutinize more closely 
the form of the warrant and to point out suspected judicial 
errors. We find such arguments speculative and conclude 
that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant 
should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in 
those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the pur-
poses of the exclusionary rule. 19 
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary \ 
rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers 
acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. "No empirical re-
searcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been 
able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a 
deterrent effect .... " United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 
452, n. 22. But even assuming that the rule effectively de-
ters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the 
law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in ac-
cord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and 
should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law en-
forcement activity. 
As we observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 
(1974), and reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S., 
at 539: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evi-
dence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
19 Our discussion of the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained in 
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant assumes, of 
course, that the officers properly executed the warrant and confined their 
search to limits specified in the warrant. 
' .. ~ 
• ! •• ,. ·- ••.• 
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to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused. Where the official con.: 
duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rationale loses much of its force." 
The Peltier Court continued, id., at 542: 
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter un-
lawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly 
be charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 
See also Illinois v. Gates, -- U. S., at -- (WHITE, J., 
concurring in the judgment); United States v. Janis, supra, 
at 459; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in part). 20 In short, where the officer's conduct is 
objectively reasonable, 
20 We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an ob-
jective one. Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the 
exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers. 
"Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however, retains 
the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement 
profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth 
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates, -- U.S. --, --, n. 15 (1983) 
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U. S. 200, 221 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring). The objective standard 
·We adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge· of 
what the law prohibits. United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542 
(1975). As Professor Jerold Israel has observed: 
"The key to the [exclusionary] rule's effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I be-
lieve, in the impetus it has provided to police training programs that make 
officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and empha-
size the need to operate within those limits. [An objective good-faith ex-
ception] ... is not likely to result in the elimination of such programs, 
which are now viewed as an important aspect of police professionalism. 
Neither is it likely to alter the tenor of those programs; the possibility that 
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely 
to encourage police instructors to pay less attention to fourth amendment 
~ .. . 
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"excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the 
. exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is pain-
fully apparent that ... the officer is acting as a reason-
able officer would and should act under the circum-
stances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect 
his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to 
do his duty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 539-540 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). 
This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer acting 
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from 
a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope. 21 In most 
such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to de-
ter. It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine 
whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause 
and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary ~ 
case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magis-
trate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that 
the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. "[O]nce the 
warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman 
can do in seeking to comply with the law." Id., at 498 (BUR-
GER, C. J., concurring). Penalizing the officer for the mag-
istrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contrib-
ute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. 
limitations. Finally, [it] ... should not encourage officers to pay less at-
tention to what they are taught, as the requirement that the officer act in 
'good faith' is inconsistent with closing one's mind to the possibility of ille-
gality." Israel, supra note 13, at 1412-1413 (footnotes omitted). 
21 According to the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, the 
situation in which an officer relies on a duly authorized warrant 
"is a particularly compelling example of good faith. A warrant is a judicial 
mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the officer 
has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly, we believe that 
there should be a rule which states that evidence obtained pursuant to and 
within the scope of a warrant is prima facie the result of good faith on the 
part of the officer seizing the evidence." Final Report 55 (1981). 
7 
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c 
We co:pclude that the marginal or nonexiste ro-
duced by suppressing ev1 ence obtained in reasonable reli-
ance on a subsequen y mvahdated searc warran cannot 
ju~ra co ts-~hrsion.-s-eeante, at-=-==: 
tWe do nofSUggest, liowever-;-that exclusion is always inap-propriate in cases where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. "[S]earches pursuant to a warrant 
will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness," Il-
linois v. Gates, supra, at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the 
judgment), for "a warrant issued by a magistrate normally 
suffices to establish" that a law enforcement officer has 
"acted in good faith in conducting the search." United 
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 823, n. 32 (1982). Neverthe- ~ 
less, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause 
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant 
he issues must be ob'e iv 1 re sonable, cf. Harlow v. fjh-
gf}!f!Jd, 457 U. . 800, 81&-819 (19 2), 22 and itTsClear that in 
some circumstances the officer 23 will have no reasonable 
grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. r 
22 In Harlow, we eliminated the subjective com anent of the ualified im-
munity pub1ic officia s enJOY m w s see ng damages for a eged eprtva-
tiofis of consfttubonal nghts. The situations are not perfectly analogous, 
but we also eschew inquiries into the sub· ective beliefs of law enforce ent 
o~ who seize eVl ence pursuant to a subsequently inva 1 ated war-
rant. Although we have suggested that "[o]n occasion, the motive with 
which the officer conducts the illegal search may have some relevance in 
determining the propriety of applying the exclusionary rule," Scott v. 
United States, 436 U. S. 128, 139, n. 13 (1978), we believe that "[s]ending 
state and federal courts into the minds of police officers would produce a 
grave and fruitless mis-allocation of judicial resources." Massachusetts v. 
Painten, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE, J ., dissenting). Accordingly, 
our good-faith in ui is confined to the objective! ascertainable question 
wht!t er a !~ we -trame cer would have own t a e 
searcfi waSffiel1"al desPite the magistrate's authOriZation. IilrrialGng tn?s 
determma wn, all o tl:ie circumstances-me u mg whether the warrant 
application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate-may be 
considered. 
l. 
Zl References to "officer" throughout this opinion should not be read too l 
narrowly. It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not 
only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the offi-
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Sup ression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if 
t e magistra e or JU ge in issumg a warrant was· misled by 
informatiOn m an a avit tlla.t t e affiant knew was false or 
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard 
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978). 
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases 
where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial 
role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 
York, 442 U. S. 319 (1979); in such circumstances, no reason-
ably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor 
would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a 
warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of proba-
ble cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 610-611 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 
--== (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Finally, de-
pending on the circumstances of the particular case, a war-
rant may be so facially deficient-i. e., in failing to particu-
larize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-
that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to 
be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at--. 
In so limiting the suppression remedy, we leave untouched l 
the probable cause standard and the various requirements for 
a valid warrant. Other objections to the modification of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule we consider to be in-
substantial. The good-faith exception for searches con-
ducted pursuant to warrants is not intended to signal our un-
willingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, and we do not believe that it will have this ef-
fect. As we have already suggested, the good-faith excep-
tion, turning as it does on objective reasonableness, should 
not be difficult to apply in practice. Even in the case of war-
cers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the 
probable-cause determination. Nothing in our opinion suggests, for exam-
ple, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a "bare bones" 
affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances 
under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search. Whitely v. 
Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971). 
·.·. •' 
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rantless searches, which are not before us today, a good-faith 
exception "should be no more difficult to apply than the 
closely related good-faith test which governs civil suits under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at --
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, supra, at 815-819. When officers have acted pursu-
ant to a warrant, the prosecution should ordinarily be able to 
establish objective good faith without a substantial expendi-
ture of judicial time. 
Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith ex-
ception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will pre-
clude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure, 
deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth 
Amendment law in its present state. 24 There is no need for 
courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding 
whether the officers' conduct manifested objective good faith 
before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amend-
ment has been violated. Defendants seeking suppression of 
the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional searches or seizures 
undoubtedly raise live controversies which Article III em-
powers federal courts to adjudicate. As cases addressing 
questions of good-faith immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
compare O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), with 
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 566, n. 14 (1978), and 
cases involving the harmless-error doctrine, compare Milton 
v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372 (1972), with Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970), make clear, courts have consid-
erable discretion in conforming their decision-making pro-
cesses to the exigencies of particular cases. 
24 The argument that defendants will lose their incentive to litigate meri-
torious Fourth Amendment claims as a result of the good-faith exception 
we adopt today is unpersuasive. Although the exception might discourage 
presentation of insubstantial suppression motions, the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on defendants by a successful motion makes it unlikely 
that litigation of colorable claims will be substantially diminished. 
, .. -·. 
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If the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment ques-
. tion is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement 
officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing 
courts from deciding that question before turning to the 
good-faith issue. 25 Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to 
determine whether the officers acted reasonably without re-
solving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth 
Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing 
courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under 
their supervision need to be informed of their errors and so 
evaluate the officers' good faith only after finding a violation. 
In other circumstances, those courts could reject suppression 
motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions 
by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers' 
good faith. We have no reason to believe that our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence would suffer by allowing review-
ing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making this 
choice. 
IV 
When the principles we have enunciated today are applied 
to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals cannot stand. The Court of Appeals 
applied the prevailing legal standards to Officer Rombach's 
warrant application and concluded that the application could 
not support the magistrate's probable-cause determination. 
In so doing, the court clearly informed the magistrate that he 
had erred in issuing the challenged warrant. This aspect of 
the court's judgment is not under attack in this proceeding. 
25 It has been suggested, in fact, that "the recognition of a 'penumbral 
zone,' within which an inadvertant mistake would not call for exclusion, 
. . . will make it less tempting for judges to bend fourth amendment stand-
ards to avoid releasing a possibly dangerous criminal because of a minor 
and unintentional miscalculation by the police." Schroeder, supra note 13, 
at 1420-1421 (footnote omitted); see Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusion-
ary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 335, 383-384 (1983). 
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Having determined that the warrant should not have is-
sued, the Court of Appeals understandably declined to adopt 
a modification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
that this Court had not previously sanctioned. Although the 
modification finds strong support in our previous cases, the 
Court of Appeals' commendable self-restraint is not to be 
criticized. We have now re-examined the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases 
where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes 
will only rarely be served by applying it in such 
circumstances. 
In the absence of an allegation that the rna · strate aban-
doned his c1etache an neutral role, suppression is apm:ppri-
at~ iftlie officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing 
their affidavit ~r c~uld not have harbored an objectively rea-
sonable belief 1n the existence of probable cause. Only re-
spondent Leon has contended that no reasonably well-trained 
police officer could have believed that there existed probable 
cause to search his house; significantly, the other respond-
ents advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach's 
application clearly was supported by much more than a "bare 
bones" affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an ex-
tensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel 
of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence suffi-
cient to create disagreement among thoughtful and compe-
tent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under 
these circumstances, the officers could reasonably rely on the 
magistrate's determination of probable cause, and application 
of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Rob 
Date: February 24, 1984 
Re: Justice White's proposed opinion in Leon 
On the whole I think Justice White has done an admirable job 
with a very difficult subject. Naturally, I have a few comments: 
--Throughout the opinion, he cites his own concurring and 
dissenting opinions in prior cases. Many times, those opinions 
are the only authority available for the proposition he is trying 
to support. On other occasions, however, majority opinions of 
the Court provide support as well and he does not cite to those 
opinions. I think the draft would be stronger if he relied on 
authority other than himself, but that is not the sort of thing 
you can suggest to another Justice, I suppose. (While reading 
the opinion, I sometimes got the feeling that Justice White was 
saying "I told you so.") / 
~~-
--In a more substantive vien, I am sure you have noted that his 
verbalization of the "good faith" standard does not include "good ~ 
faith." He has defined the test as one of "objective 
reasonableness." His reasons for rejecting a subjective ........._____. 
component in the test are contained in footnotes 20 and 22. 
Apparently, Justice White's concept of objective reasonableness 
reaches most of the situations that a "good faith" standard would 
reach. It avoids, however, the dilemma that a court 'faces when 
there are two identical violations of the "grey area" of the 4th 
Amendment with one police officer subjectively believing his 
conduct is okay, and the other believing his conduct is not. 
Justice White would examine both violations to see if they are 
objectively reasonable. This approach has obvious good and bad 
points, but I think the good probably outweigh the bad. 
Although the ALI test that we discussed still seems 
preferable to Justice White's, in practice it probably won't make 
any difference. On the surface, Justice White's test seems to 
provide a narrower exception to the exclusionary rule than a 
totality of the circumstances type test. T ' "'nspect, however, 
that in those cases where the TC determines (on his own totality 
of the circumstances scale) that evidence should be admitted, he 
will find the police conduct objectively reasonable and that 
finding will probably withstand appellate scrutiny. 
--I don't think the 2d sentence on page 23 makes sense. How can 
a police officer know in all situations whether the magistrate is 
performing his job properly? 
--I think the 2d paragraph of footnote 18 is very important and _______..._ __ -
should be included in the text. __________, 
--Also it might be nice to add a footnote that says something 
like: "If our holding in this case leads to widespread abuse by tlj-~ I 
• 
police departments, we'll go back to the old system." 
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landmark ~ecision. 
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283, at pp . 2Eil-271. Perhaps you would be wil.ling to ado a 
citation to qustamont~ at qome aooropriate nlacP. 
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Jatf' suspicion that WI?!!!.!!. shifting responsibility . T.he 
-1-conrt Paragraph in n. 18 is imnortant. Din yon consic'ler 
jncl.uding it in the text rather than subordinating it to a 
footnote? On p. 22, I would omit the second sentence in the 
first paraqraph . tf I understand it correctly, what is says 
is obvi.ous. 
In sum, I thlnk vour opinion in T.~eon is particu-
larly constructive . I believe that John - and possibly oth-
Prs who ~issent from Leon - will aqree with us in Sheppar~ -
in which probable cause existed and a judge used the wrona 
form! 
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No. 82-1771 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ALBERTO 
ANTONIO LEON ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[February - , 1984] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to 
bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence ob-
tained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ulti-
mately found to be unsupported by probable cause. To re-
solve this question, we must consider once again the tension 
between the sometimes competing goals of, on the one hand, 
deterring official misconduct and removing inducements to 
unreasonable invasions of privacy and, on the other, estab-
lishing procedures under which criminal defendants are "ac-
quitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which ex-
poses the truth. " Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 
165, 175 (1969). 
I 
In August 1981, a confidential informant of unproven reli-
ability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department 
that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy" 
were selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone 
from their residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank, Cal. 
The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale of 
methaqualone by "Patsy" at the residence approximately five 
months earlier and had observed at that time a shoebox con-
taining a large amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy." He 
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further declared that "Armando" and "Patsy" generally kept 
only small quantities of drugs at their residence and stored 
the remainder at another location in Burbank. 
On the basis of this information, the Burbank police initi-
ated an extensive investigation focusing first on the Price 
Drive residence and later on two other residences as well. 
Cars parked at the Price Drive residence were determined to 
belong to respondents Armando Sanchez, who had previously 
been arrested for possession of marihuana, and Patsy Stew-
art, who had no criminal record. During the course of the 
investigation, officers observed an automobile belonging to 
respondent Ricardo Del Castillo, who had previously been ar-
rested for possession of 50 pounds of marihuana, arrive at the 
Price Drive residence. The driver of that car entered the 
house, exited shortly thereafter carrying a small paper sack, 
and drove away. A check of Del Castillo's probation records 
led the officers to respondent Alberto Leon, whose telephone 
number Del Castillo had listed as his employer's. Leon had 
been arrested in 1980 on drug charges and a companion had 
informed the police at that time that Leon was heavily in-
volved in the importation of drugs into this country. Before 
the current investigation began, the Burbank officers had 
learned that an informant had told a Glendale police officer 
that Leon stored a large quantity of methaqualone at his resi-
dence in Glendale. During the course of this investigation, 
the Burbank officers learned that Leon was living at 716 
South Sunset Canyon in Burbank. 
Subsequently, the officers observed several persons, at 
least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arriving at 
the Price Drive residence and leaving with small packages; 
observed a variety of other material activity at the two resi-
dences as well as at a condominium at 7902 Via Magdalena; 
and witnessed a variety of relevant activity involving re-
spondents' automobiles. The officers also observed respond-
ents Sanchez and Stewart board separate flights for Miami. 
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The pair later returned to Los Angeles together, consented 
to a search of their luggage that revealed only a small amount 
of marihuana, and left the airport. Based on these and other 
observations summarized in the affidavit, App. 34, Officer 
Cyril Rombach of the Burbank Police Department, an experi-
enced and well-trained narcotics investigator, prepared an 
application for a warrant to search 620 Price Drive, 716 South 
Sunset Canyon, 7902 Via Magdalena, and automobiles regis-
tered to each of the respondents for an extensive list of items 
believed to be related to respondents' drug-trafficking activi-
ties. Officer Rombach's extensive application was reviewed 
by several Deputy District Attorneys. 
A facially valid search warrant was issued in September 
1981 by a state superior court judge. The ensuing searches 
produced large quantities of drugs at the Via Magdalena and 
Sunset Canyon addresses and a small quantity at the Price 
Drive residence. Other evidence was discovered at each of 
the residences and in Stewart's and Del Castillo's automo-
biles. Respondents were indicted by a grand jury in the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California and charged 
with consJ?iracy to possess and distribute cocaine and a vari-
ety of su~antive counts. 
The ref'pondents then filed motions to suppress the evi-
dence seized pursuant to the warrant. 1 The District Court 
held an evidentiary hearing and, while recognizing that the 
1 Respondent Leon moved to suppress the evidence found on his person 
at the time of his arrest and the evidence seized from his residence at 716 
South Sunset Canyon. Respondent Stewart's motion covered the fruits of 
searches of her residence at 620 Price Drive and the condominium at 7902 
Via Magdalena and statements she made during the search of her resi-
dence. Respondent Sanchez sought to suppress the evidence discovered 
during the search of his residence at 620 Price Drive and statements he 
made shortly thereafter. He also joined Stewart's motion to suppress evi-
dence seized from the condominium. Respondent Del Castillo apparently 
sought to suppress all of the evidence seized in the searches. App. 78-80. 
The respondents also moved to suppress evidence seized in the searches of 
their automobiles. 
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case was a close one, see App. 131, granted the motions to 
suppress in part. It concluded that the affidavit was insuffi-
cient to establish probable cause, 2 but did not suppress all of 
the evidence as to all of the respondents because none of the 
respondents had standing to challenge all of the searches. 3 
In response to a request from the Government, the court 
made clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith, but 
it rejected the Government's suggestion that the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply where evi-
dence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search 
warrant. 4 
2 "I just cannot find this warrant sufficient for a showing of probable 
cause. 
There is no question of the reliability and credibility of the informant as 
not being established. 
Some details given tended to corroborate, maybe, the reliability of [the 
informant's] information about the previous transaction, but if it is not a 
stale transaction, it comes awfully close to it; and all the other material I 
think is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt. 
So I just do not think this affidavit can withstand the test. I find, then, 
that there is no probable cause in this case for the issuance of the search 
warrant .... " App. 127. 
s The District Court concluded that Sanchez and Stewart had standing to 
challenge the search of 620 Price Drive; that Leon had standing to contest 
the legality of the search of 716 South Sunset Canyon; that none of the re-
spondents had established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the condo-
minium at 7902 Via Magdalena; and that Stewart and Del Castillo each had 
standing to challenge the searches of their automobiles. The Government 
indicated that it did not intend to introduce evidence seized from the other 
respondents' vehicles. App. 127-129. Finally, the court suppressed 
statements given by Sanchez and Stewart. Id., at 129-130. 
'"On the issue of good faith, obviously that is not the law of the Circuit, 
and I am not going to apply that law. 
I will say certainly in my view, there is not any question about good 
faith. [Officer Rombach] went to a Superior Court judge and got a war-
rant; obviously laid a meticulous trail. Had surveilled for a long period of 
time, and I believe his testimony-and I think he said he consulted with 
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The District Court denied the Government's motion for re-
consideration, App. 147, and a divided panel of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It first concluded 
that Officer Rombach's affidavit could not establish probable 
cause to search the Price Drive residence. To the extent 
that the affidavit set forth facts demonstrating the basis of 
the informant's knowledge of criminal activity, the informa-
tion included was fatally stale. The affidavit, moreover, 
failed to establish the informant's credibility. Accordingly, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that the information provided 
by the informant was inadequate under both prongs of the 
two-part test established in Aguilar v. Texas, 375 U. S. 108 
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 5 
The officers' independent investigation neither cured the 
staleness nor corroborated the details of the informant's dec-
larations. The Court of Appeals then considered whether 
the affidavit formed a proper basis for the search of the Sun-
set Canyon residence. In its view, the affidavit included no 
facts indicating the basis for the informants' statements con-
cerning respondent Leon's criminal activities and was devoid 
of information establishing the informants' reliability. Be-
cause these deficiencies had not been cured by the police in-
vestigation, the District Court properly suppressed the fruits 
of the search. The Court of Appeals refused the Govern-
ment's invitation to recognize a good-faith exception to the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Pet. for Cert. 4a. 
The Government's petition for certiorari expressly de-
clined to seek review of the lower courts' determinations that 
the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause and 
three Deputy District Attorneys before proceeding himself, and I certainly 
have no doubt about the fact that that is true." App. 140. 
5 In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. - (1983), decided last Term, the 
Court abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for determining 
whether an informant's tip suffices to establish probable cause for the issu-
ance of a warrant and substituted in its place a "totality of the circum-
stances" approach. 
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presented only the question "[ w ]hether the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the 
admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reli-
ance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be de-
fective." We granted certiorari to consider the propriety of 
such a modification. -- U. S. -- (1983). Although it 
undoubtedly is within our power to consider the question 
whether probable cause existed under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test announced last Term in Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U. S. -- (1983), that question has not been briefed or 
argued; and it is also within our authority, which we choose 
to exercise, to take the case as it comes to us, accepting the 
Court of Appeals' conclusion that probable cause was lacking 
under the prevailing legal standards. See This Court's Rule 
21.1(a). 
We have concluded that the Fourth Amendment exclusion-
ary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its 
ability to perform its intended functions. Accordingly, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Jus-
tices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a 
necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651, 65fH>57 (1961) (plurality opinion); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 462-463 (1928), or 
that the rule is required by the conjunction of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 661-662 
(Black, J., concurring); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 
20, 33-34 (1925). These implications need not detain us long. 
The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical anal-
ysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U. S. 
463 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment "has never been in-
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evi-
dence in all proceedings or against all persons." Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976). 
82-1771-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. LEON 7 
A 
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly 
precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its 
commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes 
makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or 
seizure "work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong." 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 354 (1974). The 
wrong condemned by the Amendment is "fully accomplished" 
by the unlawful search or seizure itself, ibid., and the exclu-
sionary rule is neither intended nor able to "cure the invasion 
of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered." 
Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
The rule thus operates as "a judicially created remedy de-
signed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-
tional right of the person aggrieved." United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately im-
posed in a particular case, our decisions make clear, is "an 
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were vio-
lated by police conduct." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at--. 
Only the former question is currently before us, and it must 
be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing 
the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of inherently trust-
worthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ul-
timately is found to be defective. 
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary 
rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have 
long been a source of concern. "Our cases have consistently 
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary 
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of Judge and 
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jury." United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 734 (1980). 
An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference 
with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function is 
that some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced 
sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains. 6 Particu-
6 Researchers have only recently begun to study extensively the effects 
of the exclusionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. One study 
suggests that the rule results in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of be-
tween 0.6% and 2.35% of individuals arrested for felonies. Davies, A 
Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" 
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NLJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Ar-
rests, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J. 611, 621 (forthcoming). The estimates are 
higher for particular crimes the prosecution of which depends heavily on 
physical evidence. Thus, the cumulative loss due to nonprosecution or 
nonconviction of individuals arrested on felony drug charges is probably in 
the range of2.8% to 7.1%. !d., at 680. Davies' analysis of California data 
suggests that screening by police and prosecutors results in the release be-
cause of illegal searches or seizures of as many as 1.4% of all felony arrest-
ees, id., at 650, that 0. 9% offelony arrestees are released because of illegal 
searches or seizures at the preliminary hearing or after trial, id., at 653, 
and that roughly 0.5% of all felony arrestees benefit from reversals on ap-
peal because of illegal searches. I d., at 654. See also K. Brosi, A Cross-
City Comparison of Felony Case Processing 16, 1&-19 (1979); Report of the 
Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclusionary 
Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 10-11, 14 (1979); F. Feeney, F . Dill 
& A. Weir, Arrests Without Convictions: How Often They Occur and Why 
20~206 (1983); National Institute of Justice, The Effects of the Exclusion-
ary Rule: A Study in California 1-2 (1982); Nardulli, The Societal Cost of 
the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A. B. F. Res. J. 
585, 600 (forthcoming). The exclusionary rule also has been found to af-
fect the plea-bargaining process. S. Schlesinger, Exclusionary Injustice: 
The Problem of Illegally Obtained Evidence 63 (1977). But see Davies, 
supra, at 66&-669; Nardulli, supra, at 604-606. 
Many of these researchers have concluded that the impact of the exclu-
sionary rule is insubstantial, but the small percentages with which they 
deal mask a large absolute number of felons who are released because the 
cases against them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures. 
"[A]ny rule of evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative and 
reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be 
carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deter-
ring official unlawlessness." ~llinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. --, -- (1983) 
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larly when law enforcement officers have acted in good faith 
or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of 
the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic 
concepts of the criminal justice system. Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 490. Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary 
rule, therefore, may well "generat[e] disrespect for the law 
and the administration of justice." !d., at 491. Accord-
ingly, "[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial ob-
jectives are thought most efficaciously served." United 
States v. Calandra, supra, at 348; see Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 486-487; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 447 
(1976). 
B 
Close attention to those remedial objectives has character-
ized our recent decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court has, to be sure, 
not seriously questioned, "in the absence of a more efficacious 
sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress ev-
idence from the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amend-
ment violation has been substantial and deliberate . . . . " 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. Pow-
ell, supra, at 492. Nevertheless, the balancing approach 
that has evolved in various contexts-including criminal tri-
als-"forcefully suggest[s] that the exclusionary rule be more 
generally modified to permit the introduction of evidence ob-
tained in the reasonable good-faith belief that a search or sei-
zure was in accord with the Fourth Amendment." Illinois 
v. Gates, supra, at -- (WHITE, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Court empha-
sized the costs of the exclusionary rule, expressed its view 
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Because we find that the rule 
can have no substantial deterrent effect in the sorts of situations under con-
sideration in this case, see post, at-, we conclude that it cannot pay its 
way in those situations. 
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that limiting the circumstances under which Fourth Amend-
ment claims could be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings would not reduce the rule's deterrent effect, id., at 
489-495, and held that a state prisoner who has been afforded 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim may not obtain federal habeas relief on the ground that 
unlawfully obtained evidence had been introduced at his trial. 
Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 560-563 (1979). Pro-
posed extensions of the exclusionary rule to proceedings 
other than the criminal trial itself have been evaluated and 
rejected under the same analytic approach. In United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), for example, we de-
clined to allow grand jury witnesses to refuse to answer ques-
tions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search or 
seizure since "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might 
be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings 
is uncertain at best." I d., at 348. Similarly, in United 
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), we permitted the use in 
federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally seized by state 
officials since the likelihood of deterring police misconduct 
through such an extension of the exclusionary rule was insuf-
ficient to outweigh its substantial social costs. In so doing, 
we declared that, "[i]f . . . the exclusionary rule does not re-
sult in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use in the in-
stant situation is unwarranted." !d., at 454. 
As cases considering the use of unlawfully obtained evi-
dence in criminal trials themselves make clear, it does not fol-
low from the emphasis on the exclusionary rule's deterrent 
value that "anything which deters illegal searches is thereby 
commanded by the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S., at 174. In determining whether 
persons aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evi-
dence unlawfully obtained from their co-conspirators or co-
defendants could seek suppression, for example, we found 
that the additional benefits of such an extension of the exclu-
sionary rule would not outweigh its costs. !d., at 174-175. 
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Standing to invoke the rule has thus been limited to cases in 
which the prosecution seeks to use the fruits of an illegal 
search or seizure against the victim of police misconduct. 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978); Brown v. United 
States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963). Cf. United States v. Payner, 447 
u. s. 727 (1980). 
Even defendants with standing to challenge the introduc-
tion in their criminal trials of unlawfully obtained evidence 
cannot prevent every conceivable use of such evidence. Evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and in-
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief may be used to 
impeach a defendant's direct testimony. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). See also Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U. S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971). 
A similar assessment of the "incremental furthering" of the 
ends of the exclusionary rule led us to conclude in United 
States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627 (1980), that evidence in-
admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief or otherwise as 
substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach state-
ments made by a defendant in response to "proper cross-
examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct 
examination." Id., at 627-628. 
When considering the use of evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment in the prosecution's case-in-chief, 
moreover, we have declined to adopt a per se or but for rule 
that would render inadmissible any evidence that came to 
light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal 
arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun 
v. United States, supra, at 487-488. We also have held that 
a witness' testimony may be admitted even when his identity 
was discovered in an unconstitutional search. United States 
v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978). The perception underly-
ing these decisions-that the connection between police mis-
conduct and evidence of crime may be sufficiently attenuated 
to permit the use of that evidence at trial-is a product of 
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considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the con-
stitutional principles it is designed to protect. Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979); United States v. 
Ceccolini, supra, at 279. 7 In short, the "dissipation of the 
taint" concept that the Court has applied in deciding whether 
exclusion is appropriate in a particular case "attempts to 
mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of ille-
gal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent ef-
fect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." 
Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 609 (POWELL, J., concurring in 
part). Not surprisingly in view of this purpose, an assess-
ment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an 
important step in the calculus. Dunaway v. New York, 
supra, at 218; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 603-604. 
The same attention to the purposes underlying the exclu-
sionary rule also has characterized decisions not involving the 
scope of the rule itself. We have not required suppression of 
the fruits of a search incident to an arrest made in good-faith 
reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently 
is declared unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 
U. S. 31 (1979). 8 Similarly, although the Court has been un-
7 "Brown's focus on 'the causal connection between the illegality and the 
confession' . . . reflected the two policies behind the use of the exclusionary 
rule to effectuate the Fourth Amendment. Where there is a close causal 
connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclu-
sion of evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the fu-
ture, but use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of 
the courts." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 217-218 (1979) (cita-
tion omitted). 
8 We have held, however, that the exclusionary rule requires suppres-
sion of evidence obtained in searches carried out pursuant to statutes, not 
yet declared unconstitutional, purporting to authorize searches and sei-
zures without probable cause or search warrants. See, e. g., Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). 
"Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own terms, authorized 
searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the traditional warrant 
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willing to conclude that new Fourth Amendment principles 
are always to have only prospective effect, United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 560 (1982),9 no Fourth Amendment 
decision marking a "clear break with the past" has been ap-
plied retroactively. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 
531 (1975); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 (1969); 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965). 10 The propriety 
of retroactive application of a newly announced Fourth 
Amendment principle, moreover, has been assessed largely 
in terms of the contribution retroactivity might make to the 
and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 39 (1979). The substantive Fourth Amend-
ment principles announced in those cases are fully consistent with our hold-
ing here. 
9 The Court held in United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537 (1982), that 
a construction of the Fourth Amendment that did not constitute a "clear 
break with the past" is to be applied to all convictions not yet final when 
the decision was handed down. The limited holding, see id., at 562, 
turned in part on the Court's judgment that "[f]ailure to accord any retro-
active effect to Fourth Amendment rulings would 'encourage police or 
other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a 
let's-wait-until-it's-decided approach.'" I d., at 561 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas, J., dis-
senting)). Contrary to respondents' assertions, nothing in Johnson pre-
cludes adoption of a good-faith exception tailored to situations in which the 
police have reasonably relied on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate but later found to be defective. 
10 Our retroactivity decisions have, for the most part, turned on our as-
sessments of "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the 
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, 
and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive applica-
tion of the new standards.'' Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967). 
As we observed earlier this Term, 
"In considering the reliance factor, this Court's cases have looked pri-
marily to whether law enforcement authorities and state courts have justi-
fiably relied on a prior rule of law said to be different from that announced 
by the decision whose retroactivity is at issue. Unjustified 'reliance' is no 
bar to retroactivity. This inquiry is often phrased in terms of whether the 
new decision was foreshadowed by earlier cases or was a 'clear break with 
the past."' Solem v. Stumes, No. 81-2149, circulating draft at 7-8. 
82-1771-0PINION 
14 UNITED STATES v. LEON 
deterrence of police misconduct. United States v. Johnson, 
supra, at 560-561; United States v. Peltier, supra, at 
536-539, 542. 
As yet, we have not recognized any form of good-faith ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 11 But 
the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of 
experience with the rule provides strong support for the 
modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below, 
our evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reli-
able physical evidence seized by officers reasonably ·relying 
on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 
leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissi-
ble in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 
III 
A 
Because a search warrant "provides the detached scrutiny 
of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard 
against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a 
law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime,"' United States v. Chad wick, 
433 U. S. 1, 9 (1971) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 
U. S. 10, 14 (1948)), we have expressed a strong preference 
for warrants and declared that "in a doubtful or marginal case 
a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without 
11 Members of the Court have, however, urged reconsideration of the 
scope of the exclusionary rule. See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
496 (1976) (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id., at 536 (WHITE, J., dissenting); 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. -,- (1983) (WHITE, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 60~12 (1975) (POWELL, J., 
I concurring in part); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 261-271 (1983) (POWELL, J., concurring); California v. Minjares, 443 U. S. 916 
(1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of stay). One Court of Ap-
peals, no doubt influenced by these individual urgings, has adopted a form 
of good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Wil-
liams, 622 F. 2d 830 (CA5 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1127 
(1981). 
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one it would fail." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 
102, 106 (1965). See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S., at 111. 
Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question 
whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and 
we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is 
most appropriately effectuated by according "great defer-
ence" to a magistrate's determination. Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U. S., at 419. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at 
--; United States v. Ventresca, supra, at 108--109. 
Deference to the magistrate, however, is not boundless. 
It is clear, first, that the deference accorded to a magistrate's 
finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into the 
knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that 
determination was based. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 
154 (1978). 12 Second, the courts must also insist that the 
magistrate purport to "perform his 'neutral and detached' 
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the po-
lice." Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 111. See Illinois v. 
Gates, supra, at--. A magistrate failing to "manifest that 
neutrality and detachment demanded of a judicial officer 
when presented with a warrant application" and who acts in-
stead as "an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot provide 
valid authorization for an otherwise unconstitutional search. 
Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 326--327 (1979). 
Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based 
on an affidavit that does not "provide the magistrate with a 
substantial basis for determining the existence of probable 
cause." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at --. "Sufficient in-
formation must be presented to the magistrate to allow that 
official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a 
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Ibid. 
See Aguilar v. Texas, supra at 114-115; Giordenello v. 
12 Indeed, "it would be an unthinkable imposition upon [the magistrate's] 
authority if a warrant affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliber-
ately or recklessly false statement, were to stand beyond impeachment." 
438 U.S., at 165. 
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United States, 357 U. S. 480 (1958); Nathanson v. United 
States, 290 U. S. 41 (1933). 13 Even if the warrant application 
was supported by more than a "bare bones" arodavit, a re-
viewing court may properly conclude that, notwithstanding 
the deference that magistrates deserve, the warrant was 
invalid because the magistrate's probable-cause determina-
tion reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the cir-
cumstances, Illinois v. Gates, supra, at--, or because the 
f<?rm of the warrant was improper in some respect. 
Only in the first of these three situations, however, has the 
Court set forth a rationale for suppressing evidence obtained 
pursuant to a search warrant; in the other areas, it has sim-
ply excluded such evidence without considering whether 
Fourth Amendment interests will be advanced. To the ex-
tent that proponents of exclusion rely on its behavioral ef-
fects on judges and magistrates in these areas, their reliance 
is misplaced. First, the exclusionary rule is designed to de-
ter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of 
judges and magistrates. Second, there exists no evidence 
suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore 
or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness 
13 See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964), in which the Court con-
cluded that "the record ... does not contain a single objective fact to sup-
port a belief by the officers that the petitioner was engaged in criminal ac-
tivity at the time they arrested him." !d., at 95. Although the Court was 
willing to assume that the arresting officers acted in good faith, it con-
cluded that 
"'good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.' Henry v. 
United States, 361 U. S. 98, 102. If subjective good faith alone were the 
test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the 
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only 
in the discretion of the police." !d., at 97. 
We adhere to this view and emphasize that nothing in this opinion is in-
tended to suggest a lowering of the probable-cause standard. On the con-
trary, we deal here only with the remedy to be applied to a concededly un-
constitutional search. 
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among these actors requires application of the extreme sanc-
tion of exclusion. 14 
Third, and most important, we discern no basis, and are of-
fered none, for believing that exclusion of evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrant will have a signficant deterrent effect 
on the issuing judge or magistrate. 15 Many of the factors 
that indicate that the exclusionary rule cannot provide an ef-
fective "special" or "general" deterrent for individual offend-
ing law enforcement officers 16 apply as well to judges or mag-
14 Although there are assertions that some magistrates become rubber 
stamps for the police and others may be unable effectively to screen police 
conduct, see, e. g. , 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 4.1 (1978); Kamisar, 
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" 
Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565, 
569-571 (1983); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Al-
ternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1412 (1981), we 
are not convinced that this is a problem of major proportions. See L. Tif-
fany, D. Mcintyre & D. Rotenberg, Detection of Crime 119 (1967); Israel, 
Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren 
Court, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1319, 1414, n. 396 (1977); P. Johnson, New Ap-
proaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 8-10 (Working Paper, Sept. 
1978), quoted in Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Pro-
cedure 229-230 (5th ed. 1980); R. Van Duizend, L. Sutton & C. Carter, The 
Search Warrant Process ch. 7 (Review Draft, 1983). 
16 As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized in Com-
monwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 506, -- N. E. 2d --, --
(1982): 
"The exclusionary rule may not be well tailored to deterring judicial mis-
conduct. If applied to judicial misconduct, the rule would be just as costly 
as it is when it is applied to police misconduct, but it may be ill-fitted to the 
job-created motivations of judges. . . . [I]deally a judge is impartial as 
to whether a particular piece of evidence is admitted or a particular defend-
ant convicted. Hence, in the abstract, suppression of a particular piece of 
evidence may not be as effective a disincentive to a neutral judge as it 
would be to the police. It may be that a ruling by an appellate court that a 
search warrant was unconstitutional would be sufficient to deter similar 
misconduct in the future by magistrates." 
But see United States v. Karanthanos, 531 F. 2d 26, 33-34 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 428 U. S. 910 (1976). 
'
6 See, e. g. , Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (BURGER, C. J ., 
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istrates. And, to the extent that the rule is thought to 
operate as a "systemic" deterrent on a wider audience, 17 it 
clearly can have no such effect on individuals empowered to 
issue search warrants. Judges and magistrates are not 
adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial offi-
cers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal 
prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be ex-
pected significantly to deter them. Imposition of the exclu-
sionary sanction is not necessary meaningfully to inform judi-
cial officers of their errors, and we cannot conclude that 
admitting evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant while at 
the same time declaring that the warrant was somehow de-
fective will in any way reduce judicial officers' professional 
incentives to comply with the Fourth Amendment, encourage 
them to repeat their mistakes, or lead to the granting of all 
colorable warrant requests. 18 
B 
If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a subse-
quently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, 
therefore, it must alter the behavior of individual law en-
concurring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 
37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 709-710 (1970). 
17 See, e. g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 221 (1979) (STEVENS, 
J., concurring); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 Geo. 
L. J. 365, 399-401 (1981). 
18 Limiting the application of the exclusionary sanction may well increase 
the care with which magistrates scrutinize warrant applications. We 
doubt that magistrates are more desirous of avoiding the exclusion of evi-
dence obtained pursuant to warrants they have issued than of avoiding in-
\ vasions of privacy. 
l Federal magistrates, moreover, are subject to the direct supervision of 
district courts. They may be removed for "incompetency, misconduct, ne-
glect of duty, or physical or mental disability." 20 U. S. C. § 631(1). If a 
magistrate serves merely as a "rubber stamp" for the police or is unable to 
exercise mature judgment, closer supervision or removal provides a more 
effective remedy than the exclusionary rule. 
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forcement officers or the policies of their departments. One 
could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases 
where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the 
warrant application deters future inadequate presentations 
or "magistrate shopping" and thus promotes the ends of the 
Fourth Amendment. Suppressing evidence obtained pursu-
ant to a technically defective warrant supported by probable 
cause also might encourage officers to scrutinize more closely . 
the form of the warrant and to point out suspected judicial · 
errors. We find such arguments speculative and conclude 
that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant 
should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in 
those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the pur-
poses of the exclusionary rule. 19 
We have frequently questioned whether the exclusionary 
rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending officers 
acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. "No empirical re-
searcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been 
able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a 
deterrent effect .... " United States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 
452, n. 22. But even assuming that the rule effectively de-
ters some police misconduct and provides incentives for the 
law enforcement profession as a whole to conduct itself in ac-
cord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and 
should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law en-
forcement activity. 
As we observed in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 447 
(1974), and reiterated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S., 
at 539: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or 
19 Our discussion of the deterrent effect of excluding evidence obtained in 
reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated warrant assumes, of 
course, that the officers properly executed the warrant and confined their 
search to limits specified in the warrant. 
20 
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at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived 
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evi-
dence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope 
to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree of care to-
ward the rights of an accused. Where the official con-
duct was pursued in complete good faith, however, the 
deterrence rationale loses much of its force." 
The Peltier Court continued, id., at 542: 
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter un-
lawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a 
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly 
be charged with knowledge, that the search was uncon-
stitutional under the Fourth Amendment." 
See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S., at-- (WHITE, J., con-
curring in the judgment); United States v. Janis, supra, at 
459; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 (PowELL, J., 
concurring in part). 20 In short, where the officer's conduct is 
objectively reasonable, 
20 We emphasize that the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an ob-
jective one. Many objections to a good-faith exception assume that the 
exception will turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers. 
"Grounding the modification in objective reasonableness, however, retains 
the value of the exclusionary rule as an incentive for the law enforcement 
profession as a whole to conduct themselves in accord with the Fourth 
Amendment." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. --, --, n. 15 (1983) 
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U. S. 200, 221 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring). The objective standard 
we adopt, moreover, requires officers to have a reasonable knowledge of 
what the law prohibits. United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542 
(1975). As Professor Jerold Israel has observed: 
"The key to the [exclusionary] rule's effectiveness as a deterrent lies, I be-
lieve, in the impetus it has provided to police training programs that make 
officers aware of the limits imposed by the fourth amendment and empha-
size the need to operate within those limits. [An objective good-faith ex-
ception] . . . is not likely to result in the elimination of such programs, 
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"excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is pain-
fully apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reason-
able officer would and should act under the circum-
stances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect 
his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to 
do his duty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 539-540 
(WHITE, J., dissenting). 
This is particularly true, we believe, when an officer acting 
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from 
a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope. 21 In most 
such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to de-
ter. It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine 
whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause 
and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary 
case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magis-
trate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that 
the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. "[O]nce the 
warrant issues, there is. literally nothing more the policeman 
can do in seeking to comply with the law." Id., at 498 (BUR-
which are now viewed as an important aspect of police professionalism. 
Neither is it likely to alter the tenor of those programs; the possibility that 
illegally obtained evidence may be admitted in borderline cases is unlikely 
to encourage police instructors to pay less attention to fourth amendment 
limitations. Finally, [it] ... should not encourage officers to pay less at-
tention to what they are taught, as the requirement that the officer act in 
'good faith' is inconsistent with closing one's mind to the possibility of ille-
gality." Israel, supra note 14, at 1412-1413 (footnotes omitted). 
21 According to the Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime, the 
situation in which an officer relies on a duly authorized warrant 
"is a particularly compelling example of good faith. A warrant is a judicial 
mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the officer 
has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions. Accordingly, we believe that 
there should be a rule which states that evidence obtained pursuant to and 
within the scope of a warrant is prima facie the result of good faith on the 
part of the officer seizing the evidence." Final Report 55 (1981). 
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GER, C. J., concurring). Penalizing the officer for the mag-
istrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contrib-
ute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. 
c 
We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits pro-
duced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively rea- l 
sonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search war-
rant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. See 
ante, at--. We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is 
always inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a 
warrant and abided by its terms. "[S]earches pursuant to a 
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonable-
ness," Illinois v. Gates, supra, at-- (WHITE, J., concur-
ring in the judgment), for "a warrant issued by a magistrate 
normally suffices to establish" that a law enforcement officer 
has "acted in good faith in conducting the search." United 
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 823, n. 32 (1982). Neverthe-
less, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause 
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant 
he issues must be objectively reasonable, cf. Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U. S. 800, 815-819 (1982), 22 and it is clear that in 
22 In Harlow, we eliminated the subjective component of the qualified im-
munity public officials enjoy in suits seeking damages for alleged depriva-
tions of constitutional rights. The situations are not perfectly analogous , 
but we also eschew inquiries into the subjective beliefs of law enforcement 
officers who seize evidence pursuant to a subsequently invalidated war-
rant. Although we have suggested that "[o]n occasion, the motive with 
which the officer conducts the illegal search may have some relevance in 
determining the propriety of applying the exclusionary rule," Scott v. 
United States, 436 U. S. 128, 139, n. 13 (1978), we believe that "[s]ending 
state and federal courts into the minds of police officers would produce a 
grave and fruitless mis-allocation of judicial resources." Massachusetts v. 
Painten, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Accordingly, 
our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question 
whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the 
search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. In making this 
determination, all of the circumstances-including whether the warrant 
82-1771-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. LEON 23 
some circumstances the officer 23 will have no reasonable 
grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. 
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if 
the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by 
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard 
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154 (1978). 
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases 
where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial 
role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 
York, 442 U. S. 319 (1979); in such circumstances, no reason-
ably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor 
would an officer manifest objectiv.e good faith in relying on a 
warrant based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia of proba-
ble cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S., at 610-611 
(POWELL, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates, 
supra, at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment). Fi-
nally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, 
a warrant may be so facially deficient-i. e., in failing to par-
ticularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-
that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to 
be valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, at--. 
In so limiting the suppression remedy, we leave untouched 
the probable-cause standard and the various requirements 
for a valid warrant. Other objections to the modification of 
application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate-may be 
considered. 
23 References to "officer" throughout this opinion should not be read too 
narrowly. It is necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not 
only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of the offi-
cers who originally obtained it or who provided information material to the 
probable-cause determination. Nothing in our opinion suggests, for exam-
ple, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a "bare bones" 
affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances 
under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search. See Whitely 
v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971). 
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the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule we consider to be 
insubstantial. The good-faith exception for searches con-
ducted pursuant to warrants is not intended to signal our un-
willingness strictly to enforce the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment, and we do not believe that it will have this ef-
fect. As we have already suggested, the good-faith excep-
tion, turning as it does on objective reasonableness, should 
not be difficult to apply in practice. Even in the case of war-
rantless searches, which are not before us today, a good-faith 
exception "should be no more difficult to apply than the 
closely related good-faith test which governs civil suits under 
42 U. S. C. § 1983." Illinois v. Gates, supra, at --
(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment); see Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, supra, at 815-819. When officers have acted pursu-
ant to a warrant, the prosecution should ordinarily be able to 
establish objective good faith without a substantial expendi-
ture of judicial time. 
Nor are we persuaded that application of a good-faith ex-
ception to searches conducted pursuant to warrants will pre-
clude review of the constitutionality of the search or seizure, 
deny needed guidance from the courts, or freeze Fourth 
Amendment law in its present state. 24 There is no need for 
courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding 
whether the officers' conduct manifested objective good faith 
before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amend-
ment has been violated. Defendants seeking suppression of 
the fruits of allegedly unconstitutional searches or seizures 
undoubtedly raise live controversies which Article III em-
powers federal courts to adjudicate. As cases addressing 
questions of good-faith immunity under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, 
24 The argument that defendants will lose their incentive to litigate meri-
torious Fourth Amendment claims as a result of the good-faith exception 
we adopt today is unpersuasive. Although the exception might discourage 
presentation of insubstantial suppression motions, the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on defendants by a successful motion makes it unlikely 
that litigation of colorable claims will be substantially diminished. 
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compare O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), with 
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 566, n. 14 (1978), and 
cases involving the harmless-error doctrine, compare Milton 
v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371, 372 (1972), with Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970), make clear, courts have consid-
erable discretion in conforming their decision-making pro-
cesses to the exigencies of particular cases. 
If the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment ques-
tion is necessary to guide future action by law enforcement 
officers and magistrates, nothing will prevent reviewing 
courts from deciding that question before turning to the 
good-faith issue. 25 Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to 
determine whether the officers acted reasonably without re-
solving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth 
Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing 
courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under 
their supervision need to be informed of their errors and so 
evaluate the officers' good faith only after finding a violation. 
In other circumstances, those courts could reject suppression 
motions posing no important Fourth Amendment questions 
by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers' 
good faith. We have no reason to believe that our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence would suffer by allowing review-
ing courts to exercise an informed discretion in making this 
choice. 
IV 
When the principles we have enunciated today are applied 
to the facts of this case, it is apparent that the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals cannot stand. The Court of Appeals 
25 It has been suggested, in fact, that "the recognition of a 'penumbral 
zone,' within which an inadvertant mistake would not call for exclusion, 
... will make it less tempting for judges to bend fourth amendment stand-
ards to avoid releasing a possibly dangerous criminal because of a minor 
and unintentional miscalculation by the police." Schroeder, supra note 14, 
at 1420-1421 (footnote omitted); see Ashdown, Good Faith, the Exclusion-
ary Remedy, and Rule-Oriented Adjudication in the Criminal Process, 24 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 335, 383-384 (1983). 
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applied the prevailing legal standards to Officer Rombach's 
warrant application and concluded that the application could 
not support the magistrate's probable-cause determination. 
In so doing, the court clearly informed the magistrate that he 
had erred in issuing the challenged warrant. This aspect of 
the court's judgment is not under attack in this proceeding. 
Having determined that the warrant should not have is-
sued, the Court of Appeals understandably declined to adopt 
a modification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
that this Court had not previously sanctioned. Although the 
modification finds strong support in our previous cases, the 
Court of Appeals' commendable self-restraint is not to be 
criticized. We have now re-examined the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases 
where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes 
will only rarely be served by applying it in such 
circumstances. 
In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate aban-
doned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropri-
ate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing 
their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively rea-
sonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Only re-
spondent Leon has contended that no reasonably well-trained 
police officer could have believed that there existed probable 
cause to search his house; significantly, the other respond-
ents advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach's 
application clearly was supported by much more than a "bare 
bones" affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an ex-
tensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel 
of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence suffi-
cient to create disagreement among thoughtful and compe-
tent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under 
these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, 
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and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is 
inappropriate. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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We granted three cases to address what has come to be 
called a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. 
The two cases listed above will be argued the second 
argument week in January. The third case granted - and 
briefed - is 82-1711, Colorado v. Quintero. This has been 
stricken from the argument list, as I understand it. This 
is regrettable, as only Quintero presents the good faith 
question in its broadest sense. 
Apparently the Clerk - perhaps with the CJ's approval 
- has included 82-1845, Colorado v. Nunez, in the place of 
Quintero. I have read Nunez, and my guess is that we will 
~ DIG the case on the ground that it was decided on an 
~ adequate and independent state ground. 
Accordingly, this memo will address only Shepherd and 
Leon, and each very briefly. 
Shepherd (Mass. case) 
Of course the SG states the question in Shepherd -
rather wordedly, but helpfully: 
"2. In No. 82-963, 
is whether the Fourth 
rule should be modi f ie.d 
admission of e~idence 
reliance on a search 
probable sause but later 
detective tor failure 
specification of items to 
the warrant application." 
the question presented 
amendment exclusionary 
so as not to bar the 
seized in reasonable 
warrant suppor!~d dby 
held to be technicqlly 
to incorporate~ the 
be seized contained in 
The police, after a commendable investigation, 
clearly had probable casuse to search respondent's 
residence where it was believed he had commit ted a 
brutal murder in a basement room. A police officer 
prepared an application for a search warrant that 
specified in some detail the items for which permission 
for search was sought. See SG's brief p. 11. The 
difficulty was that on a Sunday afernoon, no court clerk 
could be found and the judge to whom the application was 
delivered also had no search warrant form. A form was 
found normally used for searches for "control substances", 
and this was "marked up". The form identified the 
basement of the residence as the place to be searched, but 
omitted the "items listed in the police officer's 
affidavit in support of the application, nor was the 
affidavit attached." (p. 12, SG's brief). The judge to 
whom the form and application were submitted - though 
recognizing that it was not the proper form - nevertheless 
signed the search warrant. 
Officers arrived at the residence with the warrant 
and the affidavit. They were admitted to house by 
respondent's mother and sister, neither of whom asked to 
read the warrant. The search was highly fruitful, 
resulting in the discovery of conclusive evidence of 
respondent's guilt. No one questions the good faith of 
the police officers. They had even consulted the district 
attorney with respect to the application, and 
understandably they relied on the judge. The trial court 
agreed that the warrant was "fatally defective", but 
concluded nevertheless that the exclusionary rule should 
not be invoked because its deterrent effect would be zero. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed, 
finding the warrant defective for its failure to list the 
items specified in the affidavit. 
Leon (CA9 case) 
Th i s case , a s u i t in fed e r a 1 co u r t in C a 1 i for n i a , 
involved charges of conspiring to possess and distribute 
cocaine and various other contraband drugs. The SG' s 
brief in particular sets forth in detail the information 
that prompted the issuance of a search warrant. The 
police investigation was prompted by information obtained 
from "a confidential informant of unproven reliability". 
On the basis of this information, Burbank police 
instituted a month long investigation that focused on 
' tw=e ~ 
residences, places and persons identified by the informer. 
As the SG' s brief demonstrates (p. 3 - 7) , the pol ice 
investigation confirmed in significant detail the 
information that initiated their investigation. One of 
the investigating officer, Rombach, supported his request 
for a search warrant by his personal observation of the 
places and persons under surveillance during the month of 
investigation. Rombach was an "experienced narcotics 
officer" with "specialized training in narcotics 
investigations". 
Based on information thus provided, a State Superior 
Court Judge authorizing the search of issued a warrant ,..., ..... w-
several residences and automobiles registered in the names 
of the four respondents. In the searches based on the 
warrants, officers seized a vast amount of drugs and drug 
paraphenalia. 
A district court suppressed all of the seized 
evidence, finding that the "reliability and creditability 
of the informant had not been established". The DC noted, 
however, that there was no question about the "good faith" 
of the officers who obtained the warrant. Moreover, as 
the DC noted, Officer Rombach had consul ted with three 
Deputy United States Attorneys before proceeding". On 
appeal, CA9 (2 to 1) affirmed the suppression order. 
Judge Kennedy dissented on the basis that the informant's 
information was both adequately corroborated and 
sufficiently correct in view of the month long 
surveillance. (pp. 8 and 9). 
My Views 
Subject to further enlightenment, these are easy 
cases for me. I would reverse both of them. 
Reversal would be consistent with my concurring 
opinion in Brown v. Illinois, 422 u.s. 590, 610- 611. 
Brown was a Fourth Amendment arrest case. He had been 
arrested without probable cause or a warrant. He was then 
a....,/ 
given Miranda warnings, ~t thereafter made inculpatory 
admissions. The question was whether these statements 
were properly admitted or should have been excluded in 
Brown's murder trial under doctrine of Wong Sun. This 
Court reversed, concluding that the Miranda warnings were 
not sufficient under Wong Sun to purge the taint of the 
illegal arrest. 
As I did not approve of the Court's rather broadly 
written opnion, I concurred only in part, and drew a 
distinction between the types of police conduct that the 
exlusionary rule is intended to deter. After identifying 
situations in which the rule should apply, I wrote: 
"At the opposite end of the spectrum lie 
"technical" violations of Fourth amendment 
rights where, for example, officers in good 
faith arrest an individual in reliance on a 
later invalidated or pursuant to a 
at subsequentl-- is declared 
unconsti utiona , see Un1te States v. Kilgen, 
445 -r .2a 287 (CAS 1971). As we noted in 
Michigan v. Tucker, supra, at 447: 'The 
I 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged 
in willful, or at the very least negligent, 
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some 
right.' In cases in which this underlying 
premise is lacking, the deterrence rationale of 
the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I can 
see no legitimate justification for depriving 
the prosecution of reliable and probative 
evidence." 
The foregoing statement applies to both of the cases 
we will hear in January. 
* * * 
It is regretable that Quintero was "scrubbed", as it 
would have presented the pure "good faith" issue as 
distinguished from the "defective warrant" issue where the 
police have relied in good faith on such a warrant. In 
Quintero the question was whether the exclusionary rule 
should be modified so as not to bar the admission of 
evidence seized in the reasonable belief that the 
warrantless arrest of a burglar suspect did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. The Attorney General's brief, 
written before Quintero was scrubbed, argues primarily for 
this type of a broad exception to the rule. I would find 
this a considerably more difficult question, and would not 
address it in these two cases. 
* * * 
Note to Rob: 
There are a dozen amici briefs, and all one need do 
is identify the source of the brief to predict with 
reasonable certainty its position. I doubt the reading of 
any of them will shed any light on this case which 
otherwise is fully briefed. 
Discuss with me whether to do a bench memo. 
LFP, JR. 
01/09/84~ /TI- 0 • 
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To: Justice Powell /-d u-( c::::L,., z! I' 
From: Rob Couch ~~~ ~
Date: January 9, 1984 ~A- .. 
Re: United States v. Leon, ~~1~ 
C~: ~~~~-p~ VL-
~~ 
5' ~ v ;?~ ~ ~ Question Presented /'2e;_~.,..__/;-J ~ -
./)..~U-~ ~UA--~k_ 
Should there be a "good faith except ion" to the exclusionary 
rule? 
1?;~1-?,_; ~ ~ ~·~ 
The threshold question in this case is whether the Constitu-
tion permits the use of evidence that has been gathered in an 
unconstitutional fashion. Put another way: Is the exclusionary 
rule derived from the 4th Amendment? Of course, resps (and Jus--
tice Stewart in his Stone lecture) would answer "yes," relying on 
language in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 u.s. 643, 656-657 (1961). (Resp 
Sanchez maintains that the 5th Amendment also requires suppres-
sion of illegally seized evidence.) The Court seems to have re-
jected this notion, however, in United States v. Calandra, 414 
u.s. 338, 348 (1974): 
"In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy de-
signed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deter rent ef feet, rather than a personal 
constitutional right of the party aggrieved. 
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusion-
ary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the 
use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or 
aga-lnS€ a IT persons. - As w"'i"fh any remedial device, the 
application of the rule has been restricted to those 
areas where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served." 
See also Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 486 (1976}. 
Thus, the Constitution does not require the exclusion of all 
tainted evidence. What evidence should be excluded then? Appar-
ently, all evidence that will deter governmental misconduct. You 
seized on the deterrence rational in your concurrence in Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 v. 590, 612 (1975}: 
"'The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule neces-
sarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, 
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has de-
prived the defendant of some right.' In cases in which 
this underlying premise is lacking, the deterrence ra-
tionale of the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I 
can see no legitimate justification for depriving the 
prosecution of reliable and probative evidence." 
~~ Your language quoted above and the language used in other cases 
seems to suggest that the misconduct that is to be deterred is 
that of the police. See also Stone, at 487. But no case that I 
~m aware of states that the exclusionary rule is intended to de-
~ ter only police misdeed • in /j IW 
~V ~ Illinois v. Gates, 103 s.ct. 2317, 2345 (1983}, stated: "fT]he 
~~xclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by po-
~ li~ not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges. Magis-
f; fJ. tJ trates must be neutral and detached from law enforcement opera-
~tions and I would not presume that a modification of the exclu-
f~ ~ ~ sionary rule will lead magistrates to abdicate their 
reponsibili ty to apply the law." Justice Stewart's response to 
this argument in the Stone lectures was that the Framers could 
y::-5 ~L ~ ~ t>fo t. ~ ~~k_ 
t/- L). ~ ~ l/ll t:Z,~ • 
not have intended the Constitution to operate under some sort of 
honor system. 83 Colum. L. Rev., at 1383-1384. 
I think the correct response is somewhere in between. A mis-
behaving magistrate can cause just as much, and perhaps more, 
damage to the 4th Amendment as an errant police officer. The 
contention that the exclusionary rule is unnecessary because a 
magistrate is bound by law not to violate the Constitution is 
unconvincing; a police officer is under the same constraints. If ~ . 
the exclusionary rule is not as appropriate in cases involving l.1.. ~ . -~ . . ' 
.'ltU-"'~, ..... 
the misdeeds of a magistrate, the reason should be that exclus ~fi~
will not have a sufficient deterrent effect on the magistrate's ~ 
behavior to justify th ~ corresponding costs, i.e., freeing the 
criminal. (This line of reasoning, of course, is just a restate-
ment of your concurrence in Brown.) The reason that the exclu-
sionary rule deters police from misbehaving is that it deprives 
them of any incentive to violate a defendant's of his constitu-
tional rights. A policeman's job performance is judged by the 
... ---
number of crimes he solves. There is, therefore, a strong incen-
tive for him to be over-zealous in fereting out evidence of a 
crime. By the same token, if a court-imposed exclusionary rule 
deprives him of the evidence when he violates the Constitution, 
~e ~n incentive not to be over-zealous. 
~~~~~magistrate, on the other hand, does not have the same in-
i~e to violate the Constitution. His job and future promo-
~ tions do not depend on the number of warrants he issues. He has 
~,no ; ested inte~ng that ~~ence is, or is no~dmit­
~ at trial: To be eligible to hear a case he must be neutral 
"'----- -
.vi~ 
~ ,-:---:pz;c~{;t:;"C/;;::;i::::::Q~  
7~~ 
345, 350 ~ and detached. V' Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 u.s. 
(1972). He very well may be under some sort of psychologi~
officer who has submitte a ~ compulsion to agree with the police 
warrant application, ~, they may have become friends afters 
years of all night sessions at the station house, but he is not 
~ ... ~ ;I( (Y" , under any monetary or 
Ji_....., 
institutional pressure to side with the 
police. As a result, any deterent effect of exclusio~ is mini-....._--. ....._, 
Deterence is also reduced in situations such as the one in 
Leon because the magistrate has not done anything wrong. There 
,...,-. 
~- are no allegations that the magistrate acted in bad faith. He 
,.- Jl ,, 
simply made a close call which was later determined to be wrong. -The exclusion of the evidence in this case may cause this partie-
ular magistrate to be more careful in the future (although the 
lower court opinions in this case offer little advice for use in 
future cases), I doubt that use of the exclusionary rule in this 
(In fact, I rather 
hope it would not. If the same facts were to arise in a differ-
ent circuit, I am convinced that the reviewing court would find 
~ pro~able cause, especially after the Court's admonitions in Illi-2 ~~v. Gates last spring to give the magistrate's decision great 
~;ference.) 
 ~n addition, it is worthwhile to point out that the exclu-
~ sionary rule exacts a unusually high toll in this context. Once ~ 
the police have what they believe is a valid search warrant, they 
premises. With any luck, the search is 
successful and renders relevant evidence, which leads to more 
relevant evidence, eventually resulting in a conviction. On ap-
peal, the reviewing court finds no probable cause for the initial 
warrant. Thus, the evidence from the initial search is tainted 
as is all resulting "fruit." At that point, there is no way "to 
put the toothpaste back into the tube." The evidence is, in ef-
feet, immunized and the police are really worse off then when 
they started. 
Finally, if the Court recognizes a good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule in this case, it should have an effect on 
only a small number of cases. As pointed out in Gates, a review-
ing court gives "great deference" to a magistrate's finding of 
probable cause. 103 S.Ct., at 2331. The Court stated that re-
viewing courts should dispense with "technical requirements of 
elaborate specificity." Id., at 2330. It seems to me that there 
would be only a very few cases in which a magistrate has acted 
uJ~ with good faith and whose finding will not pass muster under the 
~"great deference" standard. It is only in that rare case that 
~~ the exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. Thus, al-
~hough the Court can expect much braying in the law reviews if it 
r ~ adopts a ~ on, in reality, it will not have much 
~-lA> II '' -
~ ~· practical effect. (Resps concede that the exclusionary rule does 
,., • J .ltvl __....,. 
vy.- not free many criminal defendants in its present form. Leon 
~ief, at 43-53; Sanchez Brief, at 60-64.) ~ 
~ ft.- So~ , I have carefully a~d the practical problems that 
~ill attend the creation of a good faith exception. The first IV~/ 
problem involves coming up with a workable formulation of the 
,, <l\ 
standard. The standard should, I think, require subjective and 
:;::: 
objective good faith on the part of both the police and the mag-
----- ="" 
istrate. Police behavior is more easily measured against a "good 
faith" standard than is the judgment of a magistrate, particular-
ly in the probable cause context. Perhaps, the magistrate's ac-
tion should be judged a~hether he acted in "total disregard of 
the existence or non-existence of probable cause" or "flagrant 
@;> 
abuse of office." The state in Shepard suggests a totality of the 
~~circumstances approach...L.. i.e., under a t~~ i.!;J .. of the ~cum­
tanc~~ ' will exclusion deter future 4th Amendment violations. 
fr Such a test is in line with recent decisions dealing with other 
aspects of the 4th Amendment, see Illinois v. Gates, but such a 
flexible standard will undoubtedly lead to a plethora of litiga-
tion. I suppose my point is that formulating the proper standard 
would be a difficult task, but not insurmountable. Application 
of the standard wi 11 also be a problem, but one to which the 
courts are accustomed. 
r~nother legitimate concern of those who are opposed to a good 
~ ~ faith exception is that it will lead to magistrate shopping. Un-
( ~ ~doubtedly, the police can recognize a magistrate's tendency to be 
~sympathetic to their cause. But I suspect that magistrate shop- ~ 
/JlM... ping already takes place. As pointed out above, a magistrate's 
finding of probable cause is only reversed in rare cases. There-
fore, if one magistrate is a push-over, the police are probably 
already taking advantage of that fact. Adoption of a good faith 
exception would not create any additional incentive to magistrate 
shop. 1 ----,..-----
~ 'P ~,c .. ~ 1-o ~~~~~LT'"I~u 
a.-. .. t A:..f-~5~ ~ 
~ Footnote (s) 1 will ~Pejr on fo~liowhg 
~~8'·~. 
pages. 
In my mind, the most serious drawback to the good 
p~'S 
faith ex- ·/ 
~ 
ception is that it might result in a lackadaisical attitude among 
magistrates. As a practical matter, the magistrate's decision to --issue a warrant would be virtually unreviewable (unless he has no 
grounds for finding probable cause). Thus, there is little in-
centive to be careful. It would be nice if the courts had some 
equitable power to oversee the actions of magistrates. 2 Anyway, 
sloppiness in the ranks of the magistrates is a risk that the 
good faith exception would entail. 
In sum, this is a very difficult issue. I think I would come 
out in favor of recognizing a good faith exception--but a very 
carefully tailored one. If you disagree, and decide that evi-
1oth~r-~~o~ms that the commentators foresee are: 
1) gooa-Faitn exception would freeze development of 4th Amendment 
law, i.e., courts would not reach constitutional issues if the 
evidence-would not be exclude~nyway. I disagree. ~he ~roEer 
analisis in a case would be t~et~ine whether a violat1on of 
ther th . Amendment has occurred, an~hen decide what the remedy 
should be if there has been a violation. Some courts might be 
tempted to take a short-cut, but I think those courts that would 
be on the cutting edge of any new developments would employ the 
proper analysis. 
2) good faith exception would encourage police ignorance of the 
law. I disagree. If_ the exception includes an11 objective 
component ~ there is no incentive for police not to keep abreast 
~ o~. If the "reasonable" police officer would know of a 
legal development, ignorance of that development would lead to 
~ exclusion. 
I had the library run a Lexis search to see if any courts make 
~ ,~_ it a practice to discipline unruly magistrates. Apparently, 
~
t ere are statutes in several states that allow a court to find a 
y•4 ~istrate in contempt or in violation of the law if he abuses 
his office. See North Carolina v. Greer, 302 S.E. 2d 774 (N.C. 
1983) ~ In re Pagliughi, 189 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1963). I could not 
find a case in which a magistrate has been disciplined for 
abusing his power to issue search warrants. 
dence should be excluded where the magistrate incorrectly finds 
probable cause, you will have trouble justifying your inclination 
to reverse in Shepard. As you will recall, the problem in Shep-
ard was that the warrant failed, through inadvertance, to list 
with particularity the i terns to be sought in the search. Both 
"probable cause" and "particularity" are mentioned in the 4th 
Amendment as necessary components of a valid warrant. Thus, both 
of those concepts have constitutional dimensions. It will be 
difficult to explain why the absence of one calls for exclusion 
of evidence, while the absence of the other does not. 
AMENDED COPY 
&upreme ~ourt of tbe 'llniteb ~tates 
No. A-299 (82-1771) 
UNITED STATES, 
v. 
ALBERTO ANTONIO LEON, ET AL .• 
Respondents, 
0 R D E R 
UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for 
the respondents, Armando Lazaro Sanchez, Patsy Ann Stewart and 
Ricardo Albert Del Castillo, 
IT IS ORDERED that the application for leave to file 
respondents' brief on the merits in excess of the page limitation 
is granted provided that the brief does not exceed 75 pages. 
/s/ William H.Rehnquist 
Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States 
rmc 01/17/84 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Rob 
Date: January 17, 1984 
Re: United States v. Leon 
1. In your memo of today you asked me to give some more 
thought to a more precise verbalization of a "good faith" stand-
ard. I have done so and have discussed my thoughts with Justice 
Blackmun's and Justice O'Connor's law clerks. 
My impression from your memo is that you would like a stand-
ard that applies equally to both police and magistrates. I don't 
know whether that is possible. As you point out, the deterrence 
rationale for the exclusionary rule suggests that it should not 
apply to magistrates to the same degree as it does to police. 
Magistrates do not have as much incentive to violate the 4th 
Amendment; so deterrence is not as vital. 
Second, an objective standard does not work as well with mag-
istrates as it does with police. For instance, in the cases that 
will be argued tomorrow, it is unclear what result would be 
reached using an objective standard. In Sheppard, the magistrate 
• 
(actually a local judge} issued a warrant that failed to describe 
the objects of the search with particularity. Any "reasonable 
magistrate" should know that the 4th Amendment requires that the 
objects of the search be listed with particularity. Thus, under 
an objective standard, the evidence would be excluded. In Leon, 
the magistrate determined that there was probable cause to 
search. A DJ disagreed. Two members of the CA9 panel agreed 
with the DJ. It would be conceptually difficult to assesss the 
magistrate's determination against a reasonableness standard. 
Under Illinois v. Gates, a magistrates decision must be given 
great deference. If a DC or CA is willing to overrule a magis-
trate's finding of probable cause, wouldn't that mean that the 
hf ftJ+" Mt..ll- • 
magistrate's decision is ipso facto unreasonable. In short, a 
standard that focuses on objective reasonableness is unsatisfac-
tory. 
The best standard ,that I can come up with that would apply to 
both police and magistrates is that espoused by the American Law -
Institute. The ALI would have courts suppress evidence only when 
II I\ -
a constitutional violation is "substantial." The recommended 
provision lists 6 factors that a court should consider in deter-
mining whether a violation was substantial such as "the extent to 
which the violation was wilful" and "the extent to which exclu-
sion will tend to prevent violations." "Substantiality" is real-
ly a contrived term~ the ALI might as well have used "totality of 
the circumstances." I have attached a copy of the ALI standard. 
It is the best, all-inclusive standard that I have heard of or 
seen. 1 
Footnote(s} 1 will appear on following pages. 
7 
I 
2. I am unaware of any Supreme Court cases that have ex-
pressly stated that the exclusionary rule should be used to deter 
magistrate misbehavior. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 u.s. 
319 (1979) was a case in which the "Town Justice" who issued the 
warrant accompanied the police to the site of the search and 
listed the items to be searched for as they were discovered. The 
Court found that the evidence should have been suppressed. The 
Court apparently was not faced with the argument that the exclu-
sionary rule should not apply to "detached judicial officers." 
Of course, the argument could be made that the reasonable police 
officer should have realized that the post-facto determination of 
probable cause in Lo-Ji violated the 4th Amendment. 
A quick West-Law search turned up United States v. Janis, 428 
U.S. 433 ( 1976) , in which the Court stated (per Blackmun, J.): 
"The Court, however, has established that the 'prime purpose' of 
the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful po-
..::...-
lice conduct.'" Although this statement is somewhat ambiguous, 
it could support the conclusion that the exclusionary rule is 
intended only to deter police misconduct and not the misconduct 
of a member of the judicial branch. I continue to think that 
that result does not make much sense. It seems to me that the 
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedial rule designed 
1 If you decide to use a "double standard," I would suggest one 
that requires exclusion only where police officers have failed to 
act with "reasonabl~, good faith," United States v. Williams, 622 
F.2d 830, 847 (1980), or where a ~rate's conduct is 
"flagrantly abusive" of 4th Amendment rights. Brown v. Illinois, 
422U.S. 590,610 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
to encourage adherence to the 4th Amendment. In my mind, the - """'-~ 
courts should be anxious to encourage all adherence, not just 
that of the executive branch. 
3. You wanted a one paragraph abstract of three cases. I 
will try my best to be concise. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 ( 1978) : The petr was tried 
for rape and related charges. Before his trial, he moved to sup-
press some evidence on the ground that the police affidavit sup-
porting the search warrant by which the evidence was discovered 
contained material misstatements. (The affiant primarily had 
relied on the remarks of an informant.) The Court held that in 
order to have the evidence suppressed the petr would have to show 
that thm ff iant included the false statement in the af f ida vi t 
knowingly and intentionally, o~ith reckless disregard for the 
truth, and that the statement was necessary to the finding of 
probable cause. The Court reached its decision after weighing 
the pros and cons of excluding probative evidence;. Obviously, 
the Court's holding lends some support to the recognition of a 
"good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. So long as the 
affiant acts in "reasonable good faith," the evidence will not be 
excluded. Nevertheless, the Court's holding is couched in narrow 
terms that seem to apply only to the situation at issue in the 
case--affidavits containing misstatements. 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 u.s. 31 (1979): A Detroit ordi-
nance made it unlawful for an individual to refuse to identify 
himself and provide evidence of his identity after being stopped 
for having suspicious behavior. The petr was arrested pursuant 
to the ordinance and searched. Drugs were discovered. The TC 
refused to suppress the evidence. The Mich. Ct. App. found the 
ordinance unconstitutionally vague, the arrest unreasonable, the 
search invalid, and the drugs subject to the exclusionary rule. 
The Court reversed. The Court stated: 
"This Court repeatedly has explained that 'probable 
cause' to justify an arrest means facts and circum-
stances within the officer's knowledge that are suffi-
cient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable 
caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that 
the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about 
to commit an offense. On this record there was 
abundant probable cause to satisfy the constitutional 
prerequisite for an arrest." Id., at 443. 
Under this reasoning, instead of recognizing a good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule, the Court was able to hold that 
the 4th Amendment had not been violated in the first place. 
United States v. Johnson, 457 u.s. 537 (1982): The resp was 
arrested by Secret Service agents who had entered his home with-
out an arrest warrant. Resp made some incriminating statements 
... ......._ ~ 
following his arrest. He sought to suppress those statements on 
the ground that his warrantless arrest was unconstitutional under 
the holding of Payton v. New York, 445 u.s. 573 (1980). The 
issue was whether Payton should be applied retroactively. The 
Court found that under traditional retroactivity doctrine, Payton 
should be applied retroactively. The majority opinion does not 
provide any support for an exception to the exclusionary rule, 
but the dissent (BRW, for CJ, WHR, and SOC) does. Justice White 
argued persuasively that retroactive application of the Payton 
rule would do little to deter police misconduct. 
t '~ 
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part II-Stai nte § ss 290.2 
uiremcnts of Sections SS 260.4 or 260.6, as the 
(2) Determination. A m_9tion to suppress evidence pur-
suant to this section s!;all be granted only if the court finds 
that the violation upon wliich it is basea was substantial, or 








States or of this State. _ ~~ M J( 
··~ If the court finds a violation not to be substantial it .. 
shall set forth its reasons for such finding. 
(3) Violations Deemed Substantial. A violation shall 
in all cases be deemed substantial if it \\'as gross, wilful and 
prejudicial to the accused. A violation shall be deemed 
·wilful regardless of the good faith of the individual officer 
if it appears to be part of the practice of the law enforce-
ment agency or was authorized by a high authority within it. 
( 4) Circumstances to Be Considered in Determining 
Substantiality. In determining whether a violation not 
covered by Subsection (3) is substantial, the court shall 
consider all the circumstances including: 
(a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct; 
(b) The extent to which the violation was wilful; 
(c) the extent to which privacy was invaded; 
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to pre-
vent violations of this Code; 
(e) whether, but for the violation, the things 
seized would have been discovered; and 
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(f) the extent to which the violation prejudiced 
the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to 
defend himself in the proceeding in which the things 
seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him. 
(5) E'rmts of Prior Unlav.rful Search. If a searc 
e is carried out in such a manner that thing 
of the search would be subject suppression 
pursuant to t receding subsections is section, and if 
as a result of such ch or se · other evidence is dis- ___ _ ; 
covered subsequently an ed against a defendant, such 
evidence shall be subje o sup · ssion unless the prosecu . 
tion establishes t such evidence uld probably have 
been discovc y law enforcement author · s irrespective 
rch or seizure, and the court finds tha ·elusion 
of ch evidence is not necessary t.o deter violations o 
Code. 
(6) Evidence of Reasonable Cause Unlav;rfully Ob-
tained. Any evidence obtained in the course of a search the 
validity . of which is dependent upon reasonable cause, 
whether pursuant to a search or arrest warrant, a warrant-
less arrest, or other authority specified in this Part II, shall 
be subject to a motion to suppress if the finding of reason-
able cause, or the officer's reasonable belief, as the case may 
be, was based in necessary part on information unlaVirfully 
acquired by an officer from the defendant or any other 
person described in Subsection SS 290.1 (5). 
NOTE 
Subsection (1) specifies that a motion to suppress may be based 
upon a violation of any provision of the Code, and then lists, for 
descriptive purposes, the principal grounds upon which such 
motions have been, or are likely to be, based. Many of these, if 
established, mandate exclusion w1der !liapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), and other Court decisions. 
Subsections (2) through ( 4) make provision for the exclusion 
of fYidence obtained as a rrsult of violations of the Cod«>'s provi-
182 
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
Ten years ago in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 
(1974), I expressed the fear that the Court's decision "may 
signal . that a majority of my colleagues have positioned 
themselves to reopen the door [to evidence secured by official 
lawlessness] still further and abandon altogether the 
.exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases." Id., at 365 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Since then, in case after case, I 
have witnessed the Court's gradual but determined strangulation 
of the rule.l It now appears that the Court's victory over the 
Fourth Amendment is complete. That today's decision represents 
the piece de resistance of the Court's past efforts cannot be 
1see, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 531, 544 (1975) 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting); United States v • . Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
460 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 
465, 502 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 
U.S. 31, 41 (1978) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 629 (1980) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
doubted, for today the Court sanctions the use in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief of illegally obtained evidence 
against the individual whose rights have been violated--a result 
that had previously been thought to be foreclosed. 
What is perhaps most striking about the Court's opinion is 
the patina of empirical precision suggested by its sober talk of 
"costs" and "benefits." But the language of deterrence and of 
cost/benefit analysis, if used indiscriminately, can have a 
narcotic effect. It creates an illusion of . technical precision 
and ineluctability. It suggests that·not only constitutional 
principle but empirical data supports the majority's result. 
When the Court's analysis is examined carefully, however, it is 
clear that we have not been treated to an honest assessment of 
the merits of the exclusionary rule, but have instead been drawn 
into a curious world where the "costs" of · ~~cluding illegally 
obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and where the 
."benefits" of such exclusion are made to disappear with a mere 
wave of the hand. 
. . 
It is crucial, therefore, to recall the fundamental 
constitutional importance of what is at stake here. While the 
machinery of law enforcement and indeed the nature of crime 
itself has changed dramatically since the Fourth Amendment became 
part of the Nation's fundamental law in 1791, what the Framers 
understood then remains true today--that the task of combatting 
crime and convicting the guilty will in every era seem of such 
critical and pressing concern that we may be lured by the 
temptations of expediency into forsaking our commitment to 
protecting individual liberty and privacy. It was for that very 
reason that the Framers of the Bill of Rights insisted that law 
enforcement efforts be permanently and unambiguously restricted 
in order to preserve personal freedoms. In the constitutional 
scheme they ordained, the sometimes unpopular task of ensuring 
that the government's enforcement efforts remain within the 
strict boundaries fixed by the Fourth Amendment was entrusted to 
the courts. As James Madison boldly predicted in his address to 
the First Congress on June 8, 1789: 
"If [these rights] are incorporated into the 
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will 
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians 
of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark 
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or 
Executive; they will naturally be led to resist every 
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in 
the Constitution by the declaration of rights." · 1 
Annals of Cong. 439 (1789). · 
If those independent tribunals lose their resolve, however, as 
.the Court has done today, and give way . to the call of expediency, 
the vital guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are reduced to 
nothing more than a "form of words." Silverthoine Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 u.s. 385, 392 (1920). 
A proper understanding of the broad purposes sought to be 
served by the Fourth Amendment demonstrates, in my judgment, that 
the principles embodied in the exclusionary rule rest upon a far 
firmer constitutional foundation than the shifting sands of the 
Court's deterrence rationale. But even if I were to accept the 
Court's chosen method of analyzing the question posed by these 
cases, I would still be forced to conclude that the Court's 
decision cannot be justified. 
I 
In these cases, the Court holds that physical evidence 
seized by police officers reasonably relying upon a warrant 
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate is admissible in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief, even though a reviewing court has 
subsequently determined that the warrant was defective, No. 82-
963, or that those officers failed to demonstrate when applying 
for the warrant that there was probable cause to conduct the 
search, No. 82-1771. I have no doubt that these decisions will 
prove in time to have been a grave mistake. But, as troubling 
and important as today's new doctrine may be for the 
administration of criminal justice in this country, the 
analytical underpinning of the Court's decision also requires 
extended critical examination, for it may .. prove in the long run 
to pose the greater threat to our civil liberties. 
A 
At bottom, the Court's decision turns on .the proposition 
that the exclusionary rule is merely a "'judicrally created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal 
constitutional right.'" Ante, at 7, quoting United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S., at 348. The germ of that idea, of course, is 
found in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 {1949), and although I had 
thought that such a narrow conception of the Yule had been 
forever put to rest by our decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
{1961), it has been revived by the present Court and indeed 
reaches full flower with today's decision. The essence of this 
view, as expressed initially in the Calandra opinion and as 
reiterated today, is the claim that the sole "pur~ose of the 
Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental 
intrusions into the privacy of one's person, house, papers, or 
effects. The wrong condemned is the unjustified governmental 
invasion of these areas of an individual's life. That wrong ... 
is fully accomplished by the original search without probable 
cause." 414 u.s., at 354 (emphasis added): see also ante, at 7. 
This reading of the Amendment implies that its proscriptions are 
directed solely at those governmental agents who may actually 
invade an individual's constitutionally protected privacy. The 
courts, under such a view, are not subject to any direct 
constitutional duty to exclude illegally obtained evidence, 
because the question of the admissibility · ~t such evidence does 
not come within the scope of the Fourth Amendment's concerns. In 
,the Court's view, the subsequent admission of such evidence 
"work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong." Calandra, supra, at 
.. 
354. The courts, therefore, are relegated to the periphery: the 
only constitutionally cognizable injury having already been 
"fully accomplished" by the police, and having no direct 
constitutional responsibility for such official wrongdoing, the 
best judges can do is to wring their hands and hope that perhaps 
by excluding such evidence they can "deter" future transgressions 
by the police. 
Such a reading appears plausible, because, as critics of 
the exclusionary rule never tire of repeating, 2 the Fourth 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
Amendment makes no express provision for the exclusion of 
evidence secured in violation of its commands. A short answer to 
this claim, of course, is that many of the Constitution's most 
vital imperativesf re stated in general terms and the task of 
giving meaning to these precepts is therefore left to subsequent 
judicial decision-making in the context of concrete cases. The 
nature of our Constitution, as Chief Justice Marshall long ago 
explained, "requires that only its great outlines should be 
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor 
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the 
nature of the objects themselves." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 407 (1819). A more direct answer may be supplied by 
focusing on the fact that the Court's current interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment simply fails to take .adequate account of the 
reasons why the police might seek to invade . an individual's 
privacy in the first place or the reasons why the Framers were 
.concerned to restrict such invasions. What the Court appears to 
have forgotten is that virtually every seizure of evidence--an 
executive act plainly covered by the terms of th~ Amendment--
looks beyond itself to some potential later use of the evidence 
at trial. Indeed, the seizure of evidence by the government is 
hardly intelligible without some reference to the courts. 
When that central fact is kept in mind, the role of the 
2see, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid 
Evidence?, 62 Judicature 215 (1978): S. Schlesinger, Exclusionary 
Injustice (1977). 
·. 
courts and their possible involvement in the concerns of the 
Fourth Amendment comes into sharper focus. Since seizures are 
executed principally to secure evidence, and since such evidence 
generally has utility in our legal system only in the context of 
-
a trial supervised by a judge, it is readily apparent that the 
courts are integrally connected to the use of evidence. 3 Once 
that connection between the evidence-gathering role of the police 
and the evidence-admitting function of the courts is 
acknowledged, the plausibility of the Court's interpretation 
becomes more suspect. Certainly nothing in the language or 
history of the Fourth Amendment suggests that a recognition of 
this evidentiary link between the police and the courts was meant 
to be foreclosed. 4 Indeed, it is difficult to give any meaning 
3In deciding to enforce the exclusionary-:rule as a matter of 
state law, the California Supreme Court clearly recognized this 
point: · 
"When, as in the present · case, the very purpose of an illegal 
.search and seizure is to get evidence to introduce at a trial, 
the success of the lawless venture depends entirely on the 
court's lending its aid by allowing the evidence to be 
introduced. It is no answer to say that a distinction should be 
drawn between the government acting as law enforcer and the 
gatherer of evidence and the government acting as judge." People 
v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P. 2d 905, 912 (1955). 
For a thoughtful examination of this point, see Schrock & Welsh, 
Upr from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional 
Requirement, 59 Minn. L. Rev. 251, 289-307 (1974). 
4Examination of the early State declarations of rights which 
formed the models for the Fourth Amendment reveals that they were 
aimed as much at explicitly limiting the manner in which 
government could gather evidence as at protecting individual 
privacy. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
provided: ~ 
"Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable ­
searches and seizures of his person, his house, his papers and . ~~ ~ 
his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this ~ J 
Footnote continued on next page. ~~ 
~ 
at all to the limitations imposed by the Amendment if it is read 
as simply proscribing certain conduct by the police but allowing 
other agents of the same government freely to take advantage of 
any evidence secured by the police in violation of its 
requirements. 5 Therefore, if a full account of the purposes of 
searches and seizures is given and if the reality of the 
situation that the Amendment was intended to address is 
right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously 
supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in the warrant 
to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to 
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, 
be not accompanied with a special designation of the person or 
objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be 
issued, but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the 
laws." Art. XIV of the Declaration of Rights of 1780. See 
generally T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 
41-43 (1969); N. Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 51-105 (1970); 
J. Lanynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court·: A Study in 
Constitional Interpretation 30-48 (1966); Stewart, The Road to 
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and Future of 
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1365, 1369 (1983). 
5 In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 u.s. 385 
(1920), the Court expressly recognized this point in rejecting 
the Government's contention that it should be p~rmitted to make 
use of knowledge obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment: 
"The Government now while in form repudiating and condemning the 
illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of 
the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would not 
have had. 
"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is 
that although of course its ~eizure was an outrage which the 
Government now regrets, it may stuay the papers Defore it returns 
them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has 
gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to produce 
them •••• In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces the 
Fourth Amendment to a form a words. The essence of a provision 
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that 
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the 
Court but that it shall not be used at all." Id., at 391-392 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). --
~- ~~1-'1 ~~,__.,.......-, ,--
~
~~ 
acknowledged, the Amendment must be read to condemn not only the 
initial unconstitutional invasion of privacy--which is done, 
after all, for the purpose of securing evidence--but also the 
subsequent use of any evidence so obtained. 
By taking what appears to be a deliberately myopic view of 
the consequences of a search or seizure, however, the Court seeks 
to draw an artificial line between the constitutional rights and -- ---responsibilities that are engaged by actions of the police and 
those that are engaged when a defendant appears before the 
courts. On such a narrow view, the substantive protections of 
the Fourth Amendment right can be viewed as wholly exhausted at 
the moment when police unlawfully invade an individual's privacy, 
and no substantive force remains therefore to those protections 
at the time of trial when the government seeks to use evidence 
obtained by the police during this invasion of the individual's 
privacy. 
I submit that such a crabbed reading of the Fourth _....___... 
Amendment wrenches the Amendment from its historical roots, casts 
aside the teaching of those Justices who first ~ormulated the 
exclusionary rule, and rests ultimately on an impoverished 
understanding of judicial responsibility in our constitutional 
scheme. For my part, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures" comprises a personal right to exclude all 
evidence secured by means of unreasonable sea~ches and seizures. 
The right to be free from the initial invasion of privacy and the 
right of exclusion are coordinate components of the central 
7 
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embracing right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 
Such a conception of the rights secured by the Fourth 
Amendment was unquestionably the original basis of what has come 
to be called the exclusionary rule when it was first formulated 
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). There the Court 
considered whether evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment by a United States Marshal could be admitted at trial 
after the defendant had moved that the evidence be returned. 
Significantly, although the Court clearly considered the 
Marshal's initial invasion of the defendant's home to be 
unlawful, it went on to consider a question that "involves the 
right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the 
purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the 
accused, seized in his house in his absende without his 
authority, by a United States Marshal holding no warrant for the 
. .•• search of his premises." Id., at 393. In answering that 
question, Justice Day, speaking for a unanimous Court, expressly 
recognized that the commands of the Fourth Amendment were 
addressed t f oth the courts and agents of the executive branch: 
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the 
courts of the United States and Federal officials, in 
the exercise of their power and authority, under 
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such 
power and authority, and to forever secure the people, 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against all 
unreasonable searches and seizures under· the guise of 
law. This protection reaches all alike, whether 
accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving it 
force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under 
our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. 
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of 
- 11 -
the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful 
seizures ••• should find no sanction in the judgments 
of the courts which are charged at all times with the 
support of the Constitution and to which people of all 
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance 
of such fundamental rights." Id., at 391-392. 
The heart of the Weeks opinion, and for me the beginning of 
wisdom about the Fourth Amendment's proper meaning, is found in 
the following passage: 
"If letters and private documents can ••• be 
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen 
accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such 
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as 
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be 
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the 
courts and [federal] officials to bring the guilty to 
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be 
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles 
established by years of endeavor and suffering which 
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental 
law of the land. The United States ~arshal could only 
have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a 
warrant issued as required by the Constitution •.•• 
Instead, he acted without sanction of law, doubtless 
prompted by the desire to bring further proof to the 
aid of the Government, and under color of his office 
undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct 
violation of the constitutional prohibition against 
such action •••. To sanction such proceedings would be 
to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if 
not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people 
against such unauthorized action." 232 U.S., at 393-
394. 
What this passage succinctly captures is the essential 
recognition, ignored by the present Court, that seizures are 
generally executed for the purpose of bringing "proof to the aid 
of the Government," id., at 393, that the utility of such 
evidence in a criminal prosecution arises ultimately in the 
context of the courts, and therefore that the courts cannot be 
- ll -
absolved of responsibility for the means by which evidence is 
obtained. As the Court in Weeks clearly recognized, the 
responsibilities cast upon government by the Fourth Amendment are 
not confined merely to the police. The essence of this point was 
summarized by Justice Holmes: "If the search and seizure are 
unlawful as invading personal rights secured by the Constitution 
those rights would be infringed yet further if the evidence were 
allowed to be used." Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 
(1926). As the Court further explained in United States v. 
Olmstead, 277 u.s. 438 (1928): 
"The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those 
which followed it was the sweeping declaration that the 
Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting 
the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its 
introduction if obtained by government officers though 
a violation of the Amendment. There~o~ore many had 
supposed under the ordinary common law rules, if the 
tendered evidence was pertinent, the method of 
obtaining it was unimportant .••• But in the Weeks 
case, and those which followed, this Court decided with 
great emphasis, and established as the law for the 
federal courts, that the protection of the _Fourth 
Amendment would be much impaired unless i~ was held 
that not only was the official violator of the rights 
under the Amendment subject to an action at the suit of 
the injured defendant, but also that the evidence 
thereby obtained could not be received." Id., at 462-
463. 
Such a conception of the rule, in my view, is more faithful 
to the meaning and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and to the 
judiciary's role as the guardian of the p~ople's constitional 
liberties. In contrast to the present Court's restrictive 
reading, the Court in Weeks recognized that, if the Amendment is 
to have any meaning, police and the courts cannot be regarded as 
constitutional strangers to each other; because the evidence-
gathering role of the police is directly linked to the evidence-
admitting function of the courts, an individual's Fourth 
Amendment rights may be undermined as completely by one as by the 
other. In this way, therefore, the exclusionary rule serves "the 
twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of 
partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people--
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct--that the 
government will not profit from its lawless behavior." United 
States v. Calandra, supra, at 357 {BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
B 
From the foregoing it is clear why the question whether or 
not the exclusion of evidence would deter future police 
misconduct was never even considered as a relevant concern in the 
early cases from Weeks to Olmstead;6 for -in those formative 
decisions, the Court plainly understood that exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence was simply the vindication of a 
·direct constitional command, rather than merely the enforcement 
of a judicially fashioned remedy. A new phase in the history of 
the rule, however, opened with the Court's deci·sion in Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 u.s. 25 {1949). Although that decision held that 
the security of one's person and privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment was "implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and 
6see generally Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary 
Rule Rest On A "Principled Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical 
Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. Rev. 565, 598-599; Mertens & 
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: 







as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process 
Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment, id., at 27-28, quoting Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 u.s. 319, 325 (1937), the Court went on, in 
what can only be regarded as a tour de force of constitutional 
obfuscation, to say that the "ways of enforcing such a basic 
right raise questions of a different orde!," 338 u.s., at 28. 
Notwithstanding the force of the Fourth Amendment and the force 
of the Weeks doctrine that the Amendment required exclusion, a 
state court was free to admit illegally seized evidence, 
according to the Court in Wolf, so long as the state had devised 
some other "effective" means of vindicating a defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. !d., at 31. 
Twelve years later, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), 
however, the Court restored the original understanding of the 
Weeks case by overruling the holding of Wolf and by repudiating 
its rationale. Although in the course of reaching this 
1conclusion the Court in Mapp responded at certain points to the 
question, first raised in Wolf, of whether the .exclusionary rule 
was an "effective" remedy compared to alternat(ve means of 
enforcing the right, see id., at 651-653, it nevertheless 
expressly held that "all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same 
authority, inadmissible in a state court." Id., at 655 (emphasis 
added). In the Court's view, the exclusionary rule was not one 
among a range of options to be selected at the discretion of 
judges, it was "an essential part of both the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments." Id., at 657. Rejection of the Wolf 
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approach was constitionally required, the Court explained, 
because "the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf 
could not consistently tolerate the denial of its . most important 
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence 
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the 
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in 
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Id., at 656. 
Indeed, no other explanation suffices to account for the Court's 
holding in Mapp, since the only constitutionally valid predicate 
for the Court's conclusion that the States were bound by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to honor the Weeks doctrine is that the 
exclusionary rule was "part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's 
limitation upon [governmental] encroachment of individual 
privacy." Id., at 651.7 
7 Indeed, the Court in Mapp expressly noted that the "factual 
considerations" raised in Wolf concerning the effectiveness of 
.alternative remedies "are not basically relevant to a decision 
that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the 
Fourth Amendment." 367 u.s., at 651. Of course it is true that 
in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 u.s. 618 (1965), in holding that 
Mapp was not to be applied retroactively, the Court described the 
exclusionary rule as the "only effective deterrent to lawless 
police action," id., at 637, thereby suggesting that the rule 
rested almost exclusively on a deterrence rationale. But, as I 
have explained on another occasion, "[t]he emphasis upon 
deterrence in Linkletter must be understood in the light of the 
crucial fact that the States had justifiably relied from 1949 to 
1961 upon Wolf ••• , and consequently, that application of Mapp 
would have required the wholesale release of innumerable 
convicted prisoners, few of whom could have been successfully 
retried. In that circumstance, Linkletter .held not only that 
retrospective application of Mapp would not further the goal of 
deterrence but also that it would not further· 'the administration 
of justice and the integrity of the judicial process.' 381 u.s., 
at 637." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at 359-360. 
- .l.O -
Despite this clear pronouncement, however, the Court since 
Calandra has gradually pressed the deterrence rationale for the 
rule back to center stage. Although, as I have explained, see 
supra, at ___ , I believe the exclusionary rule rests on a 
constitutional principle quite distinct from the deterrence 
rationale, I am also persuaded after witnessing the Court's 
efforts to grapple with the implications of such a justification 
for the rule that the analysis is so problematic that it simply 
cannot provide courts with either an accurate or fair means of 
considering whether the rule should apply in particular 
circumstances. First of all, much of the focus on the so-called 
costs of the exclusionary rule reflects, in my view, a seriously 
misdirected criticism. If nothing else, the Fourth Amendment 
plainly operates to disable the governmen~ from gathering 
information and securing evidence in certain ways. In practical 
terms, of course, this restriction of official power means that 
•Some incriminating evidence will inevitably go undetected if the 
government obeys these constitutional restraints. It is the loss 
of that evidence that is the "price" our society _pays for 
enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the Fourth 
Amendment. Thus, some criminals will go free not, in Justice 
(then Judge} Cardozo's misleading metaphor, "because the 
constable has blundered," People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 
N.E. 585, 587 (1926}, but rather because official compliance with 
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment makes it more difficult 
to catch criminals. Understood in this way, the Fourth Amendment 
directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating 
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evidence will be lost to the government, and thus it is not the 
exclusionary rule but rather the Amendment itself that has 
imposed this cost. 8 
In addition, the entire enterprise of attempting to assess 
the deterrence benefits and costs of the rule is a virtually 
impossible task for courts to perform honestly or accurately. 
Although the Court's language suggests that some specific 
empirical basis may support its analysis, the reality is that the 
Court's opinions in this area represent an inherently unstable 
compound of i~n, h~es and occasional pieces of partial 
and often inconclusive data. In Calandra, for example, the Court 
v-
8Justice Stewart has explained this point in detail in a 
recent article: 
"Much .pf the criticism leveled at the exclusionary rule is 
misdirected; it is more properly directed · ftt the Fourth Amendment 
itself. It is true that, as many observers have charged, the 
effect of the rule is to deprive the courts· of extremely 
relevant, often direct evidence of the guilt of the defendant. 
But these same critics fail to acknowledge that, in many 
·instances, the same extremely relevant evidence would not have 
been obtained had the police officer complied with the commands 
of the fourth amendment in the first place ...•. ... 
"The exclusionary rule places no limitations on the actions of 
the police. The fourth amendment does. The inevitable result of 
the Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and its requirements that no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause is that police officers who obey its 
strictures will catch fewer criminals. .•. [T]hat is the price 
the framers anticipated and were willing to pay to ensure the 
sanctity of the person, home, and property against unrestrained 
governmental power." Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and 
Beyond: The Origins, Development apa Future of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases~83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1392-
1393 (1983) (emphasis added). See also Dellinger, Of Rights and 
Remedies: The Constitution As A Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 
1563 (1972) ("Under the exclusionary rule a court attempts to 
maintain the status quo that would have prevailed if the 




had before it no concrete evidence whatever concerning the impact 
that application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would have 
in terms of either the long-term costs or the expected benefits. 
To the extent empirical data is available, it has shown, on the 
one hand, as the Court acknowledges today, that the costs are not 
as substantial as critics have asserted in the past, see ante, at 
8, n. 6, and, on the other hand, that while the exclusionary rule 
may well have certain deterrent effects, it is extremely 
difficult to assess with any degree of precision whether the 
incidence of unlawful conduct by police is now lower than it was 
prior to Mapp. See Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s., at 492, n. 32; 
United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 449-453 and n. 22 (1976) • 9 
The Court has sought to turn this uncertainty to its advantage by 
casting the burden of proof upon proponent~ of the rule, see, 
e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 u.s., a~ ~53-454. "Obviously," 
however, "the assignment of the burden of proof on an issue where 
1evidence does not exist and cannot be obtained is outcome 
determinative. [The] assignment of the burden ·is merely a way of 
. . ' 
announcing a predetermined conclusion." 10 ·-
9see generally on this point, Davies, A Hard Look at What We 
Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the 
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" 
Arrests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611, 627-629; Canon, 
Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A 
Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 s. Tex. L. J. 559, 
561-563 (1982); Critique, On the Limitation of the Empirical 
Evaluation of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spioto 
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 N~. U. L. Rev. 740 
(1974). 
Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages. 
By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing 
the rule solely on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed 
the rule of legitimacy. A doctrine that is explained as if it 
were an empirical proposition but for which there is only limited 
empirical support is both inherently unstable and an easy mark 
for critics. Indeed, JUSTICE BLACKMUN frankly admits "the 
unavoidably provisional nature of today's decisions." Ante, at 
(concurring opinion). The extent of this Court's fidelity to 
Fourth Amendment requirements, however, should not turn on such 
statistical uncertainties. I share the view, expressed by 
Justice Stewart for the Court in Faretta v. California, 422 u.s. 
806 (1975), that "[p]ersonal liberties are not based on the law 
of averages." Id., at 834. Rather than seeking to give effect 
to the -liberties secured by the Fourth Amerdment through 
guesswork about deterrence, the Court should restore to its 
proper place the principle framed 70 years ago in Weeks that an 
·individual whose privacy has been invaded in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment has a right grounded in that Amendment to 
, 
prevent the government from subsequently making· use of any 
10Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: 
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 Ind. L. J. 329, 332-333 (1973). See 
also White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 
81 Mich. L. Rev. 1273, 1281-1282 (1983) (balancing of deterrent 
benefits and costs is an "inquiry that can never be performed in 
an adequate way and the reality is thus that - the decision must 
rest not upon those grounds, but upon prior dispositions or 
unarticulated intuitions that are never justified"); Canon, 
Ideology and Reality in the Debate over the Exclusionary Rule: A 
Conservative Argument for its Retention, 23 S. Tex. L. J. 559, 
564 (1982); Kamisar, supra, at 646. 
evidence so obtained. 
II 
Application of that principle clearly requires affirmance 
in the two cases decided today. In the first, United States v. 
Leon, No. 82-1771, it is conceded by the Government and accepted 
by the Court that the affidavit filed by the police officers in 
support of their application for a search warrant failed to 
provide a sufficient basis on which a neutral and detached 
magistrate gQUld conclude that there was probable cause to 
I._ -...n 
the warrant. Specifically, it is conceded that the officers' 
application for a warrant was based in part on information 
supplied by a confidential informant of unproved reliability that 
was over five months old by the time it was relayed to the 
police._ Although the police conducted an independent 
investigation on the basis of this tip, bbth the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals concluded that the additional 
.information gathered by the officers failed to corroborate the 
details of the informant's tip and was "as cons.i~tent with 
.. 
innocence as with guilt." App. to Pet. for Cert; lOa. The 
warrant, therefore, should never have issued. Stripped of the 
authority of the warrant, the conduct of these officers was 
plainly unconstitutional--it amounted to nothing less than a 
naked invasion of the privacy of respondents' homes without the 
requisite justification demanded by the Fourth Amendment. In 
order to restore the Government to the position it would have 
been in had this unconstitutional search not occurred, therefore, 
it was necessary that the evidence be suppressed. As we said in 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971), the Warrant 
Clause is not "an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against 
the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an 
important working part of our machinery of government, operating 
as a matter of course to check the 'well-intentioned but 
mistakenly over-zealous executive officers' who are part of any 
system of law enforcement." Id., at 481. 
A close examination of the facts of this case reveals that 
this is neither an extraordinary nor indeed · a very costly step. 
The warrant had authorized a search for cocaine, methaqualone 
tablets, and miscellaneous narcotics paraphenalia at several 
locations: a condominium at 7902 Via Magdelena in Los Angeles; a 
residence at 620 Price Drive in Burbank; a ~esidence at 716 South 
Sunset ·Canyon in Burbank; and four automobiles owned respectively 
-.· 
by respondents Leon, Sanchez, Stewart, and Del Castillo. App. 
31-33. Pursuant to this warrant, the officers seized 
•approximately four pounds of cocaine and over 1,000 methaqualone 
tablets from the Via Magdalena condominium, nearly one pound of 
cocaine from the Sunset Canyon residence, about· an ounce of 
cocaine from the Price Drive residence, and certain paraphenalia 
from Del Castillo's and Stewart's automobiles. On the basis of 
this and other evidence, the four respondents were charged with 
violating 21 u.s.c. §846 for conspiring to possess and distribute 
cocaine, and §84l(a) (1) for possessing methaqualone and cocaine 
with intent to distribute. The indictment specifically alleged 
that respondents had maintained the Via Magdelena condominum as a 
storage area for controlled substances which they distributed to 
\ 
prospective purchasers. App. 27-28. 
At the suppression hearing, the District Court determined 
that none of the respondents had a sufficient expectation of 
privacy to contest the search of the Via Magdelena condominium, 
that respondents Stewart and Sanchez could challenge the search 
of their home at Price Drive, that respondent Leon was entitled 
to challenge the search of his home at Sunset Canyon, and that 
respondents Del Castillo and Stewart could contest the search of 
their cars. Given its finding that probable cause to issue the 
warrant was lacking, the District Court ruled that the evidence 
from the Price Drive residence could not be used against 
. 
respondents Stewart and Sanchez, that evidence from the Sunset 
Canyon residence could not be used against Leon, and that 
evidence obtained from both Del Castillo's and Stewart's 
'. 
automobiles could not be used against them. · App. to Pet. for 
Cert. 10a-13a. 
1 The tenor of the Court's opinion suggests that this order 
somehow imposed a grave and presumably unjustifiable "cost" on 
society. Such a suggestion, however, is a gross : exaggeration. 
Since the indictment focused upon a conspiracy among all 
respondents to use the Via Magdelena condominium as a storage 
area for controlled substances, and since the bulk of the 
evidence seized was from that condominium and was plainly 
admissible under the District Court's order, the Government would 
clearly still be able to present a strong case to the jury 
following the court's suppression order. I emphasize these 
details not to suggest how the Government's case would fare 
before the jury but rather to clarify a point that is lost in the 
Court's rhetorical excesses over the costs of the exclusionary 
rule--namely, that the suppression of evidence wiil certainly 
tend to weaken the Government's position but it rarely undermi~es 
the prosecution. Cf. infra, at In my view, a doctrine that 
preserves intact the constitutional rights of the accused, and, 
at the same time, is sufficiently limited to permit society's 
legitimate and pressing interest in criminal law enforcement to 
be served should not be so recklessly discarded. It is a 
doctrine that gives life to the "very heart of the Fourth 
Amendment directive: that a governmental search and seizure 
should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather 
evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that 
the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a 
citizen's private premises." United Stat~s · v. United States 
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972). 
In the second case before the Court, Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, No. 82-963, the State concedes and the .Court accepts 
. ' 
that the warrant issued to search respondent's ·home completely 
failed to state with particularity the things to be seized. 
Indeed, the warrant expressly and particularly described things 
such as "controlled substances" and "other paraphenalia used in, 
for, or in connection with the unlawful possession or use of any 
controlled substance" that the police had 'no reason whatsoever to 
believe were to be found in respondent's home·. Given the Fourth 
Amendment's requirement that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause ••• and particularly describing ••• the things to 
be seized." this warrant should never have been issued. The 
police who entered respondent's home, therefore, were without 
constitutional authority to do so. The effect of - this defective 
warrant was to license the officers to enter respondent's home in 
search of evidence for which they had made no showing that there 
was probable cause to believe could be found there. 
Although the Court's opinion tends to overlook this fact, 
the requirement of particularity is not a mere "technicality," it 
is an express constitutional command. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 
U.S. 85, 92 (1979); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 
(1979); Stanford v. Texas, 379 u.s. 476 (1965); Marron v. United 
States, 275 u.s. 192, 196 (1927). The purpose of that 
requirement is to prevent precisely the kind of governmental 
conduct that the faulty war~an~~~ issue here created a grave 
risk of permitting--namely, a search that·rw~s not narrowly and 
particularly limited to the things that a neutral and detached 
.magistrate had reason to believe might . be found at respondent's 
home. While it is true, as JUSTICE STEVENS ob~erves, see ante, 
at ___ , that the affidavit submitted by the po~ice set forth with 
particularity those items that they sought authority to search 
for, it is nevertheless clear that the warrant itself--the 
document which actually gave the officers legal authority to 
invade respondent's privacy--made no mention of these items. 
And, although it is true that the particular officers who applied 
for the warrant also happened to execute it and did so in 
accordance with the limits proposed in their affidavit, this 
happenstance should have no bearing on the central question 
whether these officers secured that prior judicial authority to 
conduct their search required by the Fourth Amendment. As we 
made clear in United States v. United States District Court, 
supra, at 317, "the Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior 
judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be 
reasonably exercised." See also Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 
347, 356-357 (1967) ("this Court has never sustained a search 
upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find 
evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their 
activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that 
end"). Had the warrant actually been enforced by officers other 
than those who prepared the affidavit, the same result might not 
have occured; indeed, the wholly erroneous nature of the warrant 
might have led such officers to feel at liberty to search 
throughout respondent's home in search of - ~rugs. Cf. Whitely v. 
Warden, 401 u.s. 560 (1971). I therefore fail to see how a 
.search pursuant to such a fundamentally defective warrant can be 
characterized as "reasonable." 
What the Framers of the Bill of Rights sought to accomplish 
through the express requirements of the Fourth Amendment was to 
define precisely the conditions under which government agents 
could search private property so that citizens would not have to 
depend solely upon the discretion and restraint of those agents 
for the protection of their privacy. Although the self-restraint 
and care exhibited by the officers in this case is commendable, 
that alone can never be a sufficient protection for 
constitutional liberties. I am convinced that it is not too much 
to ask that an attentive magistrate take those minimum steps 
necessary to ensure that every warrant he issues describes with 
particularity the things which his independent review of the 
warrant application convinces him are likely to be found in the 
premises. And I am equally convinced that it is not too much to 
ask that well-trained and experienced police officers take a 
moment to check that the warrant they have been issued at least 
describes those things for which they have sought leave to 
search. These convictions spring not from my own view of sound 
criminal law enforcement policy, but are instead compelled by the 
language of the Fourth Amendment and the history that led to its 
adoption. 
III 
Even if I were to accept the Court's general approach to 
the exclusionary rule, I could not agree with today's result. 
- n ~ 
There is no question that in the hands of the present Court the 
.deterrence rationale has proved to be a powerful tool for 
confining the scope of the exclusionary rule. ·In Calandra, for 
example, the Court concluded that the "speculative and 
undoubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police 
misconduct," was insufficient to outweigh the "expense of 
substantially impeding the grand jury." Id., at 351-352. In 
Stone v. Powell, the Court found that the "additional 
contribution, if any, of the consideration .of search-and-seizure 
claims of state prisoners on collateral review is small in 
relation to the costs." 428 u.s., at 493. In United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Court concluded that "exclusion 
from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a 
state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a 
sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state 
police so that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by 
exclusion." Id., at 454. And in an opinion handed down today, 
the Court finds that the "balance between costs and benefits 
comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil 
deportation hearings held by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service." INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, No. 83-491 1 slip op., at 17. 
Thus, in this bit of judicial stagecraft, while the sets 
sometimes change, the actors always have the same lines. Given 
this well-rehearsed pattern, one might have predicted with some 
assurance how the present case would unfold. First there is the 
ritual incantation of the "substantial social costs" exacted by 
the exclusionary rule, followed by the virtually foreordained 
conclusion that, given the marginal benefits, application of the 
•rule in the circumstances of these cases is not warranted. Upon 
analysis, however, such a result cannot be justified even on the 
. .. . , 
Court's own terms. 
At the outset, the Court expresses its concern that society 
has been asked to pay a high price--in terms either of setting 
guilty persons free or impeding the proper functioning of trials-
-as a result of excluding relevant physical evidence in cases 
where the police, in conducting searches and seizing evidence, 
have made only an "objectively reasonable" mistake concerning the 
constitutionality of their actions. See ante, at 7-9. But what 
evidence is there to support such a claim? 
Significantly, the Court points to none, and, indeed, as 
the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 8, n. 6, recent studies have 
demonstrated that the "costs" of the exclusionary rule--
calculated in terms of dropped prosecutions and lost convictions-
-are quite low. Contrary to the claims of the rule's critics 
that exclusion leads to "the release of countless guilty 
criminals," Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Officers, 403 
u.s. 388, 416 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting), these studies have 
demonstrated that federal and state prosecutors very rarely drop 
cases because of potential search and seizure problems. For 
example, a 1979 study prepared at the request of Congress by the 
General Accounting Office reported that only 0.4% of all cases 
actually declined for prosecution by federa~ prosecutors were 
declined primarily because of illegal search problems. Report of 
the Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the 
Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions 14 (1979). If 
lthe GAO data are stated in terms of the percentage of all arrests 
that were declined for prosecution as a result of illegal search 
' . 
· ~ 
problems, the study shows that only 0.2% of a11· felony arrests 
are declined because of potential exclusionary rule problems. 
See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) 
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and 
Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611, 
635. 11 Of course, these data describe only the costs 
11In a series of recent studies, researchers have attempted to 
quantify with some precision the actual costs of the rule. A 
Footnote continued on next page. 
attributable to the exclusion of evidence in all cases; the costs 
due to the exclusion of evidence in the narrower category of 
cases where police have made objectively reasonable mistakes must 
necessarily be even smaller. The Court, however, ignores this 
distinction and makes the mistake of weighing the aggregated 
costs of exclusion in all cases, irrespective of the 
circumstances that led to exclusion, see ante, at 7-8, against 
recent National Institute of Justice study based on data for the 
four year period 1976-1979 gathered by the California Bureau of 
Criminal Statistics showed that 4.8% of all cases that were 
declined for prosecution by California prosecutors were rejected 
because of illegally seized evidence. National Institute of 
Justice, Criminal Justice Research Report -- The Effects of the 
Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California 1 (1982}. However, if 
these data are calculated as a percentage of all arrests that 
were declined for prosecution, they show that only 0.8% of all 
arrests were rejected for prosecution because of illegally seized 
evidence. See Davies, supra, at 619. . 
In another measure of the rule's impact-~tDe number of 
prosecutions that are dismissed or result '' in acquittals in cases 
where evidence has been excluded--the available data again show 
that the Court's past assessment of the rule's costs has 
generally been exaggerated. For example, a study based on data 
,from 9 mid-sized counties in Illinois, -Michigin and Pennsylvania 
reveals that motions to suppress physical evidence were filed in 
in approximately 5% of the 7,500 cases studied;, but that such 
motions were successful in only 0.7% of all these cases. 
Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary~ Rule: An 
Empirical Assessment, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 585, 596. The 
study also shows that only 0.6% of all cases resulted in 
acquittals because evidence had been excluded. Id., at 600. In 
the GAO study, suppression motions were filed in-r0.5% of all 
federal criminal cases surveyed, but of the motions filed, 
approximately 80-90% were denied. GAO Report, supra, at 8, 10. 
Evidence was actually excluded in only 1.3% .of the cases studied, 
and only 0.7% of all cases resulted in acquittals or dismissals 
after evidence was excluded. Id., at 9-11. - And in another study 
based on data from cases during-1978 and 1979 in San Diego and 
Jacksonville, it was shown that only 1% of all cases resulting in 
nonconviction were caused by illegal searches~ Feeney, Dill & 
Weir, Arrests Without Conviction: How Often They Occur and Why 
(1983). See generally Davies, supra, at 663. 
the potential benefits associated with only those cases in which 
evidence is excluded because police reasonably but mistakenly 
believe that their conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
see ante, at 16-22. When such faulty scales are used, it is 
little wonder that the balance tips so often in favor of 
restricting the application of the rule. 
What then supports the Court's insistence upon permitting 
this evidence to be admitted? Apparently, the only answer is the 
Court's expressed conviction that even though the costs of 
exclusion are not very substantial, the potential deterrent 
effect in these circumstances is so marginal that exclusion 
cannot be justified. The key to the Court's conclusion in this 
respect is its belief that the prospective deterrent effect of 
the exclusionary rule operates only in those situations in which 
police officers, when deciding whether td~6 forward with some 
particular search, have reason to know that their planned conduct 
' 1will violate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See ante, 
at 20-21. If these officers in fact understand. {or reasonably 
. . 
should understand because the law is well-settieq) that their 
proposed conduct will offend the Fourth Amendment and that 
consequently any evidence they seize will be suppressed in court, 
they will refrain from conducting the planned search. In those 
circumstances, the incentive system created by the exclusionary 
rule will have the hoped-for deterrent effect. But, according to 
the Court, in situations where police officer~ reasonably (but 
mistakenly) believe that their planned conduct satisfies Fourth 
Amendment requirements--either (a) because they are acting on the 
I 
basis of an apparently valid warrant, or (b) because their 
conduct is only later determined to be invalid as a result of a 
subsequent change in the law or the resolution of an unsettled 
question of law--then such officers will have no reason to 
refrain from conducting the search and, accordingly, the 
exclusionary rule will have no effect. 
At first blush, there is some logic to this position. 
Undoubtedly, in the situation hypothesized by the Court, the 
existence of the exclusionary rule cannot be expected to have any 
deterrent effect on the particular officers at the moment they 
are deciding whether to go forward with the search. Indeed, the 
subsequent exclusion of any evidence seized under such 
circumstances appears somehow "unfair" to the particular officers 
involved. As the Court suggests, these officers have acted in 
what they thought was an appropriate and constitutionally 
authorized manner, but then the fruit of their efforts is 
·nullified by the application of the exclusionary rule. Ante, at 
21-22. 
. . 
The flaw in the Court's argument, however; : is that this 
logic captures only one comparatively minor element of the 
generally acknowledged purposes of the exclusionary rule. To be 
sure, the rule operates to some extent to deter future misconduct 
by individual officers who have had evidence suppressed in their 
own cases. But what the Court overlooks is that the rule is not 
designed to be, nor should it be thought of as, a form of 
"punishment" of individual police officers for their failures to 
obey the r~straints imposed by the Fourth Amendment. See United 
States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-557 (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting). Instead, the central function of the rule is its 
tendency to promote institutional compliance with Fourth 
Amendment requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies 
generally. 12 Thus, as the Court has previously recognized, "over 
the long term, [the] demonstration [provided by the exclusionary 
rule] that our society attaches serious consequences to violation 
of constitutional rights is thought to encourage those who 
formulate law enforcement policies, and the · officers who 
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their 
value system." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 492. It is only 
through such an institution-wide mechanism that information 
12As Justice Stewart has observed: 
"[T]he exclusionary rule is not - designed to serve a specific 
deterrence function; that is, it is not designed to punish the 
particular police officer for · -~i~I~ting a person's fourth 
amendment rights. Instead, ·the rule is designed to produce 
'systematic deterrence': the exclusionary rule is intended to 
,create an incentive for law enforcement officials to establish 
procedures by which police officers are trained _to comply with 
the fourth amendment because th~ purpose of th~ criminal justice 
system--bringing criminals to justice--can be achieved only when 
evidence of guilt may be used against defendants~" Stewart, 
supra, at 1400. See also Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 709-710 (1970) 
("[t]he exclusionary rule is not aimed at special deterrence 
since it does not impose any direct punishment on a law 
enforcement official who has broken the rule •••• The 
exclusionary rule is aimed at affecting the wider audience of all 
law enforcement officials and society at large. It is meant to 
discourage violations by individuals who have never experienced 
any sanction for them."); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith 
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and 
Derailing the Law, 70 Geo. L. J. 365, 399-401 (1981); Kamisar, 
Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled 
Basis" Rather Than An "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 Creighton L. 
Rev. 565, 597, n. 204 (1983). 
,.j 
concerning Fourth Amendment standards can be effectively 
communicated to rank and file officers. 13 
If the overall educational effect of the exclusionary rule 
is considered, however, application of the rule to even those 
13Although specific empirical data on the systemic deterrent 
effect of the rule is not conclusive, the testimony of those 
actually involved in law enforcement suggests that, at the very 
least, the Mapp decision had the effect of increasing police 
awareness of Fourth Amendment requirements and of prompting 
prosecutors and police commanders to work towards educating rank 
and file officers. For example, as former New York Police 
Commissioner Murphy explained the impact of the Mapp decision: "I 
can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law 
enforcement which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect ••.• I 
was immediately caught up in the entire program of reevaluating 
our procedures, which had followed the Defore rule, and 
modifying, amending, and creating new policies and new 
instructions for implementing Mapp •.••• Retraining sessions had 
to be held from the very top administrators down to each of the 
thousands of foot patrolmen." Murphy, Judicial Review of Police 
Methods in Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by Police 
Departments, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 939, 941 (19~6). 
Further testimony about the impact of the Mapp decision can be 
found in the statement of Deputy Commission~er Reisman: "The Mapp 
case was a shock to us. We had to reorganize our thinking, 
frankly. Before this, nobody bothered to _take out search 
warrants. Although the U.S. Constitution requires warrants in 
most cases, the u.s. Supreme Court had ruled that evidence 
obtained without a warrant--illegally, if you will--was 
admissible in state courts. So the feeling was~ why bother? 
Well, once that rule was changed we knew we had · better start 
teaching our men about it." N.Y. Times, April 28, 1965, at 50, 
col. 1. A former United States Attorney and now Attorney General 
of Maryland, Stephen Sachs, has described the impact of the rule 
on police practices in similar terms: "I have watched the rule 
deter, routinely, throughout my years as a prosecutor ••.• 
[P]olice-prosecutor consultation is customary in all our cases 
when Fourth Amendment concerns arise .••• In at least three 
Maryland jurisdictions, for example, prosecutors are on twenty-
four hour call to field search and seizure questions presented by 
police officers." Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's 
Defense, 1 Crim. J. Ethics 28, 30 (1982). See also LaFave, The 
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Dr~wing "Bright Lines" 
and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 319 (1982): Merten & 
Wasserstrom, supra, at 394-401. 
situations in which individual police officers have acted on the 
basis of a reasonable but mistaken belief that their conduct was 
authorized can still be expected to have a considerable long-term 
deterrent effect. If evidence is consistently excluded in these 
circumstances, police departments will surely be prompted to 
instruct their officers to devote greater care and attention to 
providing sufficient information to establish probable cause when 
applying for a warrant, and to review with some attention the 
form of the warrant that they have been issued, rather than 
automatically assuming that whatever document the magistrate has 
signed will necessarily comport with Fourth Amendment 
requirements. 
After today's decision, however, that institutional 
incentive will be lost. Indeed, the Court's "reasonable mistake" 
exception to the exclusionary rule will tend to put a premium on 
police ignorance of the law. Armed with the assurance provided 
1by today's decision that evidence will always ·be admissible 
whenever an officer has "reasonably" relied upon . a warrant, 
police departments will be encouraged to train officers that if a 
warrant has simply been signed, it is reasonable, without more, 
to rely on it. Since in close cases there will no longer be any 
incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior, police 
would have every reason to adopt a "let's-wait-until-its-decided" 
approach in situations in which there is a question about a 
warrant's validity or the basis for its issuance. Cf. United 
States v. Johnson, 457 u.s. 537, 561 {1982) • 14 
Footnote{s) 14 will appear on following pages. 
Although the Court brushes these concerns aside, a host of 
grave consequences can be expected to result from the Court's 
decision to carve this new exception out of the exclusionary 
rule. A chief consequence of today's decision will be the clear 
and unambiguous message conveyed to magistrates that their 
decisions to issue warrants are now insulated from subsequent 
judicial review. Creation of this new exception for good faith ------------
reliance upon a warrant implicitly tells magistrates that they 
need not take much care in reviewing warrant applications, since 
their mistakes will from now on have virtually no consequence: If 
their decision to issue a warrant was correct, the evidence will 
be admitted; if their decision was incorrect but the police 
relied in good faith on the warrant, the evidence will also be 
admitted. Inevitably, the care and attention devoted to such an 
inconsequential chore will dwindle. Althdugh the Court is 
correct to note that magistrates do not share the same stake in 
•the outcome of a criminal case as the police, they nevertheless 
need to appreciate that their role is of some moment in order to 
continue performing the important task of carefully reviewing 
14The authors of a recent study of the warrant process in seven 
cities concluded that application of a good faith exception where 
an officer relies upon a warrant "would further encourage police 
officers to seek out the less inquisitive magistrates and to rely 
on boilerplate formulae, thereby lessening the value of search 
warrants overall. Consequently, the benefits of adoption of a 
broad good faith exception in terms of a few additional 
prosecutions appears to be outweighed by the harm to the quality 
of the entire search warrant process and the criminal justice 
system in general." Van Duizend, Sutton & Carter, The Search 
Warrant Process: Preconceptions, Perceptions, Practices 8-12 
(1983). See also Stewart, supra, at 1403. 
I 
warrant applications. Today's decision effectively removes that 
incentive. 15 
Moreover, the good faith exception will encourage police to 
provide only the bare minimum of information in future warrant 
applications. Since the police will now know that if they can 
secure a warrant, so long as the circumstances of its issuance 
are not "entirely unreasonable," ante, at 24, all police conduct 
pursuant to that warrant will be insulated from further judicial 
review. 16 The clear incentive that operated in the past to 
15Just last Term in Illinois v. Gates, U.S. (1983), the 
Court noted: 
"Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to 
allow that official to determine probable cause; his action 
cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. 
In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's 
duty does not occur, courts must continue .to conscientiously 
review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are 
issued." Id., at After today's decls1on, there will little 
reason for-reviewing courts to conduct such a conscientious 
review; rather, these courts will be more likely to focus simply 
on the question of police good faith. The Court's confident 
1prediction that such review will continue to be conducted, see 
ante, at A5-26, it is difficult to believe that busy courts faced 
with heavy dockets will take the time to render. essentially 
advisory opinions concerning the constitutionality of the 
magistrate's decision before considering the of£icer's good 
faith. 
16As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed 
in this regard: 
"If a magistrate's issuance of a warrant were to be, as the 
government would have it, an all but conclusive determination of 
the validity of the search and of .the admissibility of the 
evidence seized thereby, police officers might have a substantial 
incentive to submit their warrant applications to the least 
demanding magistrates, since once the warrant was issued, it 
would be exceedingly difficult later to exclude any evidence 
seized in the resulting search even if the warrant was issued 
without probable cause •••• For practical purposes, therefore, 
the standard of probable cause might be diluted to that required 
by the least demanding official authorized to issue warrants, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
establish probable cause adequately because reviewing courts 
would examine the magistrate's judgment carefully, see, e.g., 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 u.s. 154, 169-170 (1978) : · Jones v. United 
States, 362 u.s. 257, 271-272 (1960): Giordenello v. United 
States, 357 U.S. 480, 483 (1958), has now been so completely 
vitiated that the police need only show that it was not "entirely 
unreasonable" under the circumstances of a particular case for 
them to believe that the warrant they were issued was valid. See 
ante, at 24. The long run effect will unquestionably be to 
undermine the integrity of the warrant process. 
Finally, even if one were to assume, as the Court 
apparently does, that police are hobbled by inflexible and hyper-
technical warrant procedures, today's decision cannot be 
justified. This is because, given the relaxed standard for 
assessing probable cause established just.·last Term in Illinois 
v. Gates, u.s . (1983), the Court's newly fashioned good 
. faith exception, when applied in the warrant context, will 
rarely, if ever, offer any greater flexibility tor police than 
.. 
the Gates standard already supplies. In Gates;~ the Court held 
that "the task of an issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ••• there is 
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Id., at The task of a 
even if this fell well below what the Fourth Amendment required." 
United States v. Karanthanos, 531 F. 2d 26, 34 (CA2 1976). 
reviewing court is confined to determining whether "the 
magistrate had a 'substantial basis' for concluding that probable 
cause existed." Ibid. Given such a relaxed standard, it is 
virtually inconceivable that a reviewing court, when faced with a 
defendant's motion to suppress, could first find that a warrant 
was invalid under the new Gates standard, but then, at the same 
time, find that a police officer's reliance on such an invalid 
warrant was nevertheless "objectively reasonable" under the test 
/ 
announced today. 1 7 Since the two standards overlap so 
completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid 
under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as 
objectively reasonable; otherwise, we would have to entertain the 
mind-boggling concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an 
objectively unreasonable warrant. 
This paradox, as JUSTICE STEVENS suggests, see ante, at 
--' perhaps explains the Courtrs ~nwillingness to remand No. 82-
,1771 for reconsideration in light of Gates, for it is quite 
likely that on remand the Court of Appeals would . find no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, thereby demon$trating that the 
supposed need for the good faith exception in this context is 
more apparent than real. Therefore, although the Court's 
decisions are clearly limited to the situation in which police 
17see Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and 
Beyond, 69 Iowa 551, 588-589 (1984); Wasserstrom, The Incredible 
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257 (1984): La 
Fave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing 
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307 (1982). 
officers reasonably rely upon an apparently valid warrant in 
conducting a search, I am not at all confident that the exception 
unleashed today will remain so confined. Indeed, . the full impact 
of the Court's regrettable decision will not be felt until the 
Court attempts to extend this rule to situations i~ which the 
police have conducted a warrantless search solely on the basis of 
their own judgment about the existence of probable cause and 
exigent circumstances. When that question is finally posed, I 
for one will not be surprised if my colleagues decide once again 
that we simply cannot afford to protect Fourth Amendment rights. 
IV 
When the public, as it quite properly has done in the past 
as well as in the present, demands that those in government 
increas_e their efforts to combat crime, i.t is all too easy for 
those government officials to seek expedient solutions. In 
contrast to such costly and difficult measrires as building more 
~risons, improving law enforcement methods, oi hiring more 
prosecutors and judges to relieve the overburdened court systems 
. ' 
in the country's metropolitan areas, the relaxatton of Fourth 
Amendment standards seems a tempting, costless means of meeting 
the public's demand for better law enforcement. In the long run, 
however, we as a society pay a heavy price for such expediency, 
for as Justice Jackson observed, the rights guaranteed in the 
Fourth Amendment "are not mere second-class rights but belong in 
the catalog of indispensable freedoms." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (dissenting opinion). Once 
lost, such rights are difficult to recover. There is hope, 
- 40 -
however, that in time this Court or some later Court will recall 
how precious these freedoms are and will restore Fourth Amendment 
rights to the high place where they belong in our society. 
I dissent. 
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I a m content t o leave the circulating 
drafts in these cases as they are; and if 
Bill is, I am ready to have them come down on 
Thursday. 
&82-1771 United States v. Leon (Rob) 
BRW for the Court 1/21/84 
1st draft 2/23/84 
3rd draft 3/14/84 
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5th draft 6/26/84 
Joined by LFP 2/25/84 




WJB will dissent 2/24/84 
TM awaiting dissent 2/24/84 
2nd draft 2/28/84 
See JPS ltr to BRW 3/2/84 (planning to 
write short opinion) 
HAB concurring 
1st draft 3/15/84 
WJB dissent 
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